Tax Compliance: Ethical Orientation, Risk Perception And The Role Of The Tax Preparer by Soliz, Ashley Beckett
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2015 
Tax Compliance: Ethical Orientation, Risk Perception And The 
Role Of The Tax Preparer 
Ashley Beckett Soliz 
University of Mississippi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Soliz, Ashley Beckett, "Tax Compliance: Ethical Orientation, Risk Perception And The Role Of The Tax 
Preparer" (2015). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 350. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/350 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more 
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
 TAX COMPLIANCE: ETHICAL ORIENTATION, RISK PERCEPTION 
AND THE ROLE OF THE TAX PREPARER 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree 
in the Patterson School of Accountancy 
The University of Mississippi 
 
 
 
 
by 
ASHLEY BECKETT SOLIZ 
December 2015
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Ashley Beckett Soliz 
All rights reserved 
  ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In a voluntary tax system, taxpayers have an opportunity to avoid or evade paying taxes.  
The reasons for and the causes of noncompliance are expansive.  One way to increase revenue to 
the government without increasing taxes is to focus on deterring tax evasion and tax 
underreporting.  The purpose of this study was to examine the effects on tax compliance of the 
taxpayer’s ethical orientation and perceived financial risk, as well as the role of the tax preparer 
in the compliance decision.  This research adds to the current tax compliance literature by 
investigating (in an experimental setting) the role of the tax preparer in situations where income 
is not reported to a third party and the tax law is clear, yet noncompliance still occurs.  
Additionally, this study improves upon previous studies by incorporating an income-earning 
task, rather than participants receiving an endowment or being given a hypothetical tax scenario.  
By having participants earn income, the study provides participants with the same sense of 
income ownership that real-world taxpayers would typically experience.  Finally, this study 
improves upon current studies measuring risk by incorporating a domain specific risk perception 
measurement scale.  For an individual, perceived risk may vary across different risk domains.  
Therefore, it is beneficial to use a financial risk perception measure, rather than a general 
measure of risk that includes nonfinancial items.  I find a significant main effect regarding the 
enforcement message of the tax preparer.  Individuals receiving a high enforcement message are 
significantly more compliant than individuals receiving a low enforcement message.  
Additionally, I find a significant interaction between taxpayer financial risk perception and 
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ethical orientation, implying that the impact of ethical orientation on tax compliance depends on 
the level of the individual’s financial risk perception.  Specifically, when financial risk 
perception is low, tax compliance does not differ based on the level of an individual’s ethical 
reasoning.  However, when an individual perceives financial risk to be high, individuals with low 
ethical reasoning are significantly less compliant than individuals with high ethical reasoning. 
With regard to absolute compliance, the study demonstrates a significant positive relationship 
between 100% compliance and high ethical reasoning. Policymakers and regulators may be able 
to use this information in developing more effective means to increase individual tax 
compliance.  
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I: INTRODUCTION 
Tax compliance is an ongoing concern for the government of the United States.  
Estimates from an Internal Revenue Service Research, Analysis and Statistics working paper 
(Black, Bloomquist, Emblom, Johns, Plumley & Stuk, 2012) indicate that the tax gap (the 
amount of tax revenue the U.S. government is failing to collect) related to underreporting was an 
estimated $376 billion for the 2006 tax year.  This estimate includes underreporting of the 
individual income tax ($235 billion), the corporate income tax ($67 billion), employment taxes 
($72 billion) and the estate tax ($2 billion).  Considering that nearly two-thirds of the net tax gap 
is related to underreporting of the individual income tax, it is important to understand the factors 
that affect individual income tax compliance.   
Citizens are expected to self-report income on tax returns and comply with the tax laws 
set forth by Congress and regulated by the Internal Revenue Service.  The Panel on Taxpayer 
Compliance Research of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), in a report commissioned by 
the IRS, defined tax compliance as follows:  
Compliance with reporting requirements means that the taxpayer files all required tax 
returns at the proper time and that the returns accurately report tax liability in accordance 
with the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court decisions applicable at the time 
the return is filed.  When the taxpayer’s return reports a tax liability less than the accurate 
amount, we use the term underreporting.  Similarly, we use the term overreporting when 
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the taxpayer reports a liability greater than required.  Underreporting and overreporting 
are both forms of noncompliance, as the panel uses the term (p. 21). 
 When there is a lack of third party reporting to the government, as is the case for self-employed 
taxpayers, there is an opportunity not only to underreport income but to overstate deductions as 
well.  Taxpayers who are subject to third party reporting and withholding still have the 
opportunity to underreport by overstating deductions.  There are numerous reasons and 
justifications by taxpayers for underreporting.  First, the ambiguous nature of the tax system 
provides the necessary opportunity for underreporting of taxable income.  Moreover, many 
citizens do not agree with the tax system due to moral or equity concerns and choose to evade 
taxes.  Finally, there is a monetary incentive for underreporting because, when undetected, the 
taxpayer keeps more income.  
Various demographic variables, variables that proxy for noncompliance opportunity, 
attitudinal variables and structural variables have been investigated to help explain non-
compliance.  Of specific interest to this study are ethical orientation, risk perceptions and the role 
of the tax preparer.  There is strong evidence in the literature that individuals with high ethical 
standards are less likely to intentionally evade taxes (Ghosh & Crain, 1995; Reckers, Sanders & 
Roark, 1994; Wenzel, 2005).  Previous research also indicates that perceived risk of audit and 
penalty has a significant relationship with tax compliance (Alm, McClelland & Schulze, 1992; 
Schauer & Bajor, 2007; Scholz & Pinney, 1995).  
The advice given by and the influence of tax professionals may also affect tax 
compliance, because the tax professional is an advisor and advocate for the taxpayer (Klepper & 
Nagin, 1989).  This dual role places the preparer as both an enforcer of the tax laws and as an 
advisor to assist the client in paying the minimum taxes due as required by such laws.  When the 
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tax preparer assumes an enforcement role, his or her influence may help to overcome a 
taxpayer’s propensity towards noncompliance due to the influences of the taxpayer’s ethical 
orientation and risk perception.  Hence, the specific research questions addressed in this study 
are as follows: 
1. Does the preparer’s communication of both audit risk and required income disclosure 
affect the taxpayer’s compliance decision? 
2. Is there a relationship between ethical orientation and tax reporting compliance? 
3. Is there a relationship between risk perception and tax reporting compliance? 
Motivation for the Study 
  In the last decade, the U.S. has once again faced the issue of increasing federal debt.  As 
stated in projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2001, the federal government 
could have erased its debt by 2006 and, in turn, would have been in the black by 2011.  Due to 
economic changes, tax cuts, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stimulus spending in response 
to the economic crisis, the debt actually increased rather than decreased by the year 2011 
(pewtrusts.org, 2011).  Although the yearly federal budget deficit has decreased in recent years 
(from $1,300 billion in 2011 to $483 billion in 2014), the total federal debt continues to increase 
(cbo.gov, 2015).  As long as there are budget deficits, the total federal debt will continue to 
accumulate. 
One way to increase revenue to the government without increasing taxes is to focus on 
deterring tax evasion and tax underreporting.  The individual income tax is the greatest source of 
revenue for the U.S. government (Black et al., 2012).  According to 2001 IRS estimates of the 
tax gap, only 1.2 % of wages, salaries, and tips were underreported.  Therefore, the great 
majority of underreported income stems from self-employed individuals (Rettig, 2010).  As such, 
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there is merit in understanding the characteristics of individual taxpayers and the elements in the 
tax environment that contribute to noncompliance.   
Regulators, in an attempt to improve compliance, have an inherent interest in 
understanding why some taxpayers comply with tax laws and others do not and how the tax 
preparer fits into the compliance equation.  With the number of professionally prepared returns 
increasing, the IRS would benefit from an improved understanding of the preparer’s part in the 
tax compliance decision.  Paid return preparers file about 60 percent of all individual tax returns 
each year (Johnson, 2015).  The role preparers play in the tax environment has been investigated 
but research to date is inconclusive.  Book (2008) points out that most government efforts to 
increase compliance are aimed at “tempering practitioner’s appetites for exploiting ambiguity.”  
While this is important, the tax gap data indicates that a large portion of tax underpayment 
relates to unambiguous tax situations (Black et al., 2012).  Therefore, regulation imposing 
practitioner penalties for taking aggressive tax positions on ambiguous items does not address 
the issue of taxpayer underpayment when the tax law is clear.  Further research is needed to 
investigate the relationship between taxpayers and tax preparers in unambiguous tax situations in 
order to assist policymakers and regulators in developing more effective means to increase 
individual tax compliance.  
Tax Compliance Research 
Taxpayers have various motivations for noncompliance.  An opportunity to underreport 
income or overstate deductions opens the door for noncompliance.  The classic model of tax 
evasion – based on expected utility and the economics of crime approach by Becker (1968) – 
assumes that taxpayers behave in a completely economic manner, only taking into account the 
risk of detection and punishment.  The model contends that taxpayers weigh the expected 
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benefits of noncompliance (based on income level and tax rate) against the potential costs (based 
on the probability of detection and penalty).  Using this model, it would seem that most 
taxpayers would be noncompliant, since the actual audit rate is less than 1%.  In reality, tax 
compliance is much higher than the expected utility model implies.  It seems that other, non-
economic factors affect the compliance decision. 
In an attempt to better explain actual compliance rates, later models included non-
economic factors relevant to the compliance decision.  Fischer, Wartick, and Mark (1992) 
categorized factors influencing compliance into four broad categories: (1) demographic 
variables, (2) variables that proxy for noncompliance opportunity, (3) attitudinal variables, and 
(4) structural variables.  These categories provide a good basis for discussing the variables found 
in individual tax compliance research and will be discussed in greater detail in the literature 
review.  
Ethics and Tax Compliance 
Hogan (1973) defines ethics as normative systems of rules of conduct developed to 
provide guidance in social or interpersonal settings.  There is strong evidence in the literature 
that individuals with high ethical standards are less likely to intentionally evade taxes (Ghosh & 
Crain, 1995; Reckers et al., 1994; Wenzel, 2005).  In addition, the taxpayer’s ethical judgments 
are influenced by the taxpayer’s opportunity to evade and these two variables cannot be treated 
as being independent of each other (Blanthorne & Kaplan, 2008).  Furthermore, existing research 
indicates that there is a relationship between ethical standards and risk perception, and that this 
relationship provides insight into individual tax compliance (Eisenhauer, Geide-Stevenson, & 
Ferro, 2011; Ghosh & Crain, 1995). 
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Risk and Tax Compliance 
In tax compliance research, the risk of audit and the taxpayer’s response to such risk are 
important variables in explaining the compliance decision.  Rohrmann (2008) defines risk 
attitude as a generic orientation (mind-set) towards taking (risk propensity) or avoiding (risk 
aversion) a risk when deciding how to proceed in situations with uncertain outcomes.  Risk 
behavior is defined as the actual behavior of people when facing a risk situation.  Risk perception 
is the individual judgment of whether a particular choice or decision involves risk.  Schauer and 
Bajor (2007) point out that audit risk perception is more important to understand than actual 
probabilities of audit and detection, because taxpayers react and make decisions based on their 
perceptions of the risk.  Furthermore, for an individual, perceived risk is varied  across different 
risk domains (Schoemaker, 1990) and individual differences in behavior may be attributable to 
perceived risk rather than general risk attitude (Weber & Hsee, 1998).  Therefore, in the current 
study, a domain specific risk scale will be used to measure risk perception.  This improves upon 
other studies by measuring perceived risk, rather than strictly measuring risk behavior or risk 
attitude, on the financial domain relevant to the tax compliance decision.  
The Tax Preparer and Tax Compliance 
The relationship between a taxpayer and his or her tax preparer consists of a complex 
exchange of information.  It is the taxpayer’s responsibility to provide the preparer with accurate 
information on which the preparer then bases his or her recommendations regarding various tax 
positions.  In some instances, the tax law is clear, but in other situations it is not.  In these cases, 
the preparer is responsible for advising the client to take the most favorable tax position.  
However, it is possible that, even in situations where the tax law is clear, the tax preparer still 
affects the compliance decision.  The preparer’s role in tax compliance, as described in previous 
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research (Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Hite and McGill, 1992; Tan, 1999) is the role of an enforcer 
of the tax law when the law is clear and an advocate for the taxpayer when ambiguity exists in 
the law.  Book (2008), in a field study of taxpayers, tax preparers, and lenders, found that while 
tax preparers may help increase compliance by reducing computational errors and interpreting 
complex legal issues, preparers contribute to noncompliance as well.  Preparers may misapply 
the law, misunderstand the law, or fail to obtain relevant facts from clients.  While the impact of 
preparers in ambiguous tax situations has been investigated in numerous research studies, the 
failure of tax preparers to obtain complete and accurate information from their clients and its 
impact on compliance has received little attention.  The current due diligence requirements of 
Circular 230 (and the related guidance) allow preparers to rely on taxpayer-provided 
information, without holding the preparer responsible for noncompliance (Morse, 2009).  
Therefore, there is an opportunity for preparers to take a “don’t ask, don’t tell” perspective 
regarding their client’s disclosure of income. 
According to an April 2012 GAO Report (White, 2012), approximately 60 percent of all 
tax returns filed are prepared by paid tax preparers and these preparers “play a critical role in 
answering taxpayers’ questions and filing tax returns.”  As reported by Collins, Milliron & Toy 
(1992), in two separate national surveys (Yankelovich, Skelly, & White, Inc., 1984 and a 1988 
IRS poll), the primary reason for using a tax preparer was fear of making a mistake or the desire 
for a correct return.  The second most common objective cited for using a tax preparer is tax 
savings.  Hence, tax preparers have a dual role - to encourage taxpayers to file complete and 
accurate returns (role of enforcer) and to assist in maximizing the taxpayer’s after-tax income by 
interpreting the tax law in the most favorable position for the taxpayer (role of advisor).  When 
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the taxpayer faces an issue with legal ambiguity, the advice given by tax professionals affects tax 
compliance because the tax professional is an advisor and advocate for the taxpayer. 
Taxpayers may choose to use a preparer even when the law is clear and there is little 
complexity in preparing the return.  Individuals often make decisions after consulting with and 
being influenced by others.  Previous research in advice-taking indicates that individuals take, 
seek, or follow advice for several reasons – to enhance their representation of a decision problem 
(Yaniv, 2004), to build confidence in their decisions (Heath & Gonzalez, 1995), and to share 
responsibility (Harvey & Fisher, 1997).  An individual uses a tax preparer to assist in filing a tax 
return.  A large number of such individual taxpayers are not facing ambiguous tax situations.  
Additionally, self-employed taxpayers are, in many cases, not subject to third party income 
reporting.  In cases where the tax law is clear, the communication between the preparer and the 
self-employed taxpayer may involve, among other items, communication of audit risk and the 
taxpayer’s disclosure of total income.  When discussing these items, the tax preparer’s choice of 
communication, in the role as an enforcer of the tax law, may affect the compliance decision of 
the taxpayer.     
Method 
This study examines the research questions in an experimental setting.  The independent 
variables are preparer enforcement communication, ethical orientation, and risk perception.  The 
dependent variables are tax compliance rate (a continuous variable) and whether the participant 
complied 100% or was less than 100% compliant (a dichotomous variable).  The experiment 
consists of a questionnaire, an income-earning task, and an income-reporting task.  Each 
participant answers a questionnaire containing items regarding demographics, ethical orientation 
and risk perception.  After completing the questionnaire, each participant completes a 
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computerized multiplication task that determines income.  This enables each participant to report 
his/her income and calculate the corresponding income tax.  
The experiment initially uses a 1x2 between participants design with the participants 
randomly assigned to either the “low preparer enforcement” treatment group or the “high 
preparer enforcement” treatment group.  Each participant is categorized according to risk 
perception and ethical orientation.  Consequently, the final model is a 2x2x2 design with one 
experimental manipulation and two blocked variables.  A participant’s risk perception is 
measured by his/her score on the four items from the financial subscale of the DOSPERT 
instrument, while ethical orientation is measured by the Mach IV questionnaire.  This scale is a 
well-validated measure of Machiavellianism and has been used extensively in business research 
(eg. Ghosh & Crain, 1995; McLean & Jones, 1992; Murphy, 2012).  The dependent variable is 
measured two ways.  For the ANOVA and ANCOVA, the dependent variable, tax compliance 
rate, is calculated as the ratio of the participant’s income self-reported to the full amount of 
income earned.  Additionally, the dependent variable is analyzed as an absolute 
compliance/absolute noncompliance variable for the chi square tests and logistic regression.   
Purpose and Contributions of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to examine the effects of the individual taxpayer’s ethical 
orientation and risk perception on the tax compliance decision when a tax preparer 
communicates to the taxpayer audit risk and required income disclosure (the role of enforcer 
when the tax law is unambiguous).  Results of this study indicate a significant main effect 
regarding the enforcement message of the tax preparer.  Individuals receiving a high enforcement 
message are significantly more compliant than individuals receiving a low enforcement message.  
These findings, which have not been previously reported, contribute meaningfully to the 
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understanding of the role of the tax preparer in the individual tax compliance decision.  Prior 
research has indicated that both risk perception and ethics affect the compliance decision, but to 
the author’s knowledge, there has been no study to date that includes the potential influence of 
the preparer’s role as an enforcer of the tax law.   
Additionally, this study improves upon Eisenhauer et al. (2011) by investigating the 
taxpayer’s compliance decision using an income-earning task rather than an endowment.  
Moreover, this study aims to provide further understanding of how risk perception and ethical 
standards affect tax compliance as an effort to extend the existing compliance literature, 
specifically that of Ghosh and Crain (1995).  This study improves upon the work of Ghosh and 
Crain (1995) by using a domain-specific scale for measuring risk perception.  A significant 
interaction between the financial risk perception of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s ethical 
orientation is found in this study, implying that the impact of the ethical orientation of the 
taxpayer is different for individuals with high financial risk perception versus individuals with 
low financial risk perception.  Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that tax compliance is 
not significantly different for individuals with high ethical reasoning versus low ethical 
reasoning, when the individual perceives risk to be low. However, when an individual perceives 
risk to be high, individuals with low ethical reasoning are significantly less compliant than 
individuals with high ethical reasoning.  Information from this study may help policymakers and 
regulators in developing less costly and more effective means to increase individual tax 
compliance.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II presents a detailed 
review of the literature relevant to this study.  Chapter III includes the research hypotheses, the 
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experimental task, the methodology used to collect the data, and a detailed explanation of the 
variables included in the data analysis.  Chapter IV presents the data analyses and results of the 
study.  Finally, Chapter V discusses the results and limitations of the research, as well as 
provides ideas for future research. 
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II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Tax Compliance 
In an IRS Research, Analysis and Statistics Working Paper (March 2012), Black et al. 
estimate the individual income tax underreporting gap for tax year 2006 to be $235 billion.  The 
underreporting of income can stem from several causes: ambiguous tax language, intentional 
noncompliance, or errors in calculating income, deductions or the amount of tax owed.  There is 
extant research regarding ambiguity - those situations in which neither the taxpayer nor the 
Internal Revenue Service can determine the proper tax treatment of certain income or deduction 
items.  Ambiguity of the tax law provides an opportunity for underreporting.  The underreporting 
may be an unintentional misinterpretation of the tax law, or the taxpayer may use the ambiguity 
to intentionally evade the tax system.  Much of the research concerning tax ambiguity consists of 
surveys involving subjects answering scenario-type questions regarding ambiguous tax situations 
(Bobek & Hatfield, 2003), and there have been numerous studies on the role of tax preparers in 
interpreting ambiguous tax situations (Erard, 1993; Hite & McGill, 1992; Schmidt, 2001).  
Research in the field of taxation regarding intentional noncompliance has progressed 
from modeling tax compliance as a simple form of gambling against the odds of being caught to 
more complicated models incorporating economic, social, and ethical factors.  Early tax 
compliance studies used an “expected utility” model, first applied to tax research by Allingham 
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and Sandmo (1972).1  That model assumes that individuals only pay taxes because of 
enforcement and punishment by the government and is based on the economics of crime 
approach developed by Becker (1968).  Eisenhauer (2008, p. 46) states that in the Allingham and 
Sandmo model, “compliance has been attributed primarily, if not exclusively, to the expected 
penalty for evasion, its uncertainty, and the taxpayer’s own aversion to risk.”  The model, 
therefore, fails to take into account non-economic factors influencing compliance.  For example, 
with an audit rate of 1%, the Allingham and Sandmo model would predict most taxpayers to be 
noncompliant, since the actual audit rate is less than 1% in the United States.  In reality, tax 
compliance is much higher than expected utility implies (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998).  
Through the years, the Allingham-Sandmo model has been improved by incorporating the roles 
of other variables including (but not limited to) tax and penalty structure, morals, social 
dynamics and the use of tax preparers (Andreoni et al., 1998).  While the inclusion of these 
variables has furthered our understanding of individual tax compliance, in many cases their 
inclusion has been insufficient to direct policy change (Hamm, 1995). 
Other researchers have used prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), to explain compliance.  Alm et al. (1992) suggest that compliance is greater than 
expected utility would predict because subjects seem to overestimate the probability of audit.  
The authors attribute this overweighting to taxpayers’ using a non-linear transformation of 
probabilities, which is one of the principles of prospect theory2.  More recently, Dhami and al-
Nowaihi (2007) also found that prospect theory, rather than expected utility theory, provides a 
                                                
1 For a detailed explanation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, see Pyle (1991). 
2 For a detailed explanation of prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
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better explanation of actual compliance rates.  Additionally, prospect theory has been used in the 
compliance literature to investigate differences in compliance when taxpayers are in a refund due 
versus a tax owed position.  White, Harrison and Harrell (1993) used prospect theory to explain 
the impact of the taxpayer’s withholding position across low, medium and high detection rates 
and penalties.  Results indicated that taxpayers in a tax due position are significantly more likely 
to be noncompliant than taxpayers who are in a refund due position.  Yaniv (1999) also used 
prospect theory to analyze the role of payment position (refund due or tax owed) in the 
compliance decision and found that sufficiently high advance payments may lead to full 
compliance, but the relationship is dependent upon detection efforts and the taxpayer’s 
overestimate of audit probabilities. 
Eisenhauer (2006, 2008) developed an adaptation of the expected utility model, wherein 
deterrence is measured by both risk aversion and morality.  The contribution of Eisenhauer’s 
research was the development of a tax compliance model and measurement of the shadow price 
of morality, incorporating the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.  Eisenhauer (2006) 
explains the shadow price of morality to be “the value that an individual places on his or her own 
adherence to ethical standards of conduct” (p. 437).  In their 2006 experimental study, the 
shadow price of morality was measured to be roughly 15 percent (or 15 cents per dollar).  Using 
time-series data on self-employed taxpayers, Eisenhauer (2008) again measured the shadow price 
of morality and found it to be 39%. 
Existing tax compliance literature has extensively investigated numerous factors 
influencing the tax reporting decisions of individuals.  Fischer et al. (1992) categorized factors 
influencing compliance into four broad categories: (1) demographic variables, (2) variables that 
proxy for noncompliance opportunity, (3) attitudinal variables, and (4) structural variables.  
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These categories provide a good basis for discussing the variables found in individual tax 
compliance research.  
The most common demographic variables investigated in tax compliance research are 
gender, age and marital status.  This study includes the variables of gender and age, but marital 
status is not included in the current research because the majority of the participants in this study 
are unmarried.  The results of studies on the relationship between gender and tax compliance 
have been mixed.  Research by Yeaton and Stellenwerf (2008) provides an explanation for the 
mixed results by analyzing gender and educational level.  For younger, less educated taxpayers, 
female taxpayers tend to be more compliant than male taxpayers; but, as educational level 
increases, gender is not a significant predictor of compliance.  Eisenhauer et al. (2011) found a 
correlation between ethical preferences and gender, age, and marital status in a recent 
experimental tax compliance study.  Taxpayers who were married, female and older were 
significantly more likely to exhibit strong ethical preferences than their counterparts.  Several 
prior studies have also found age to have an indirect, positive effect on tax compliance (Jackson 
& Milliron, 1986; Roth, Scholz, & Witte, 1989; Wenzel, 2002).  
Occupation and income source, income level, and educational level are some of the most 
common variables used as proxies for noncompliance opportunity.  In order for a taxpayer to 
successfully evade taxes, an opportunity to underreport without detection must exist.  
Compliance is extremely high when a taxpayer’s income is reported to the IRS by a third party 
(Kagan, 1989).  Results in previous research consistently find that, when there is opportunity due 
to lack of third party reporting, noncompliance occurs to a greater extent (Hashimzade, Myles, 
Page & Rablen; 2014; Alm, Deskins, & McKee, 2009; Antonides & Robben, 1995; Smith, 
1990).  Several studies suggest that individuals self-select into occupations based on their 
  
16 
intended compliance behavior (Hashimzade et al., 2014; Andreoni et al., 1998).  In studies 
investigating the relationship between income level and tax compliance, the results have been 
mixed.  Some have found that as income level rises, compliance decreases (Alm & Cronshaw, 
1993; Clotfelter, 1983; Feinstein, 1991), while others have found the opposite effect (Dubin, 
Graetz, & Wilde, 1990; Kamdar, 1997).  A direct, negative relationship has been found between 
educational level and tax compliance (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Roth et al., 1989).  
 Common structural variables investigated in previous compliance literature include the 
marginal tax rate, the audit rate, and the associated penalties of noncompliance.  Early research 
found evidence that increased audit rates and higher penalties increase the level of taxpayer 
compliance (Casey & Scholz, 1991; Dubin & Wilde, 1988; Friedland, 1982; Friedland, Maital, & 
Rutenberg, 1978; Witte & Woodbury, 1985).  Alm et al. (1992), in a study examining income 
level, tax rate, penalty rate and audit rate, found that compliance increases with audit rate and 
decreases with tax rate.  They did not find a strong relationship between tax compliance and 
penalty rate.  Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005), using 1985 Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) data, also found a negative relationship between tax rate and 
compliance.   
Tax compliance research has evolved from simple models of expected utility and 
deterrence to various models including not only economic variables, but also demographic, 
structural and attitudinal variables.  Methodologies for researching individual tax compliance 
include archival, longitudinal, field studies, surveys and experiments.  Because the current study 
seeks to examine the impact on compliance by ethical orientation, taxpayer risk perception, and 
the preparer’s enforcement role, the remainder of this review will be limited to those tax 
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compliance studies involving measures of ethics and risk, as well as those studies examining the 
use of a tax preparer. 
Ethics and Tax Compliance 
Tax compliance can be explained in part by expected utility theory and deterrence theory, 
but these theories do not tell the entire story.  Prior research suggests that ethical orientation and 
moral reasoning significantly impact tax compliance.  Alm (1991) states that some taxpayers are 
compliant because they believe that cheating is wrong.  Therefore, these taxpayers do not act 
purely on economic factors in their decision to comply, but on moral and social factors as well.  
Reckers et al. (1994) found that individuals with high ethical beliefs about tax compliance are 
more compliant, regardless of their tax position.  A distinguishing mark of the Reckers et al. 
(1994) study is that ethical beliefs were measured specifically in the context of taxation.  Wenzel 
(2005), in a longitudinal study, also found a significant negative relationship between tax ethics 
and tax evasion.  
Other research in individual tax compliance has examined the effect of individual’s 
general ethical orientations.  In one such study, Ghosh and Crain (1995) investigated the 
relationship between tax compliance and ethical standards using the Mach IV scale (Christie and 
Geis, 1970) to measure ethics.  The results of the study indicated that individuals with higher 
ethical standards are more compliant.  Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers (1997) found that 
taxpayers who exhibit high moral reasoning report lower tax evasion intentions.  They also 
determined that moral reasoning moderates the effectiveness of educational communications by 
the government.  However, their results indicated that the communication regarding legal 
sanctions was only effective in lowering evasion for those individuals exhibiting low moral 
reasoning.  Moral reasoning was measured using the Defining Issues Test (DIT).  Trivedi, 
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Shehata and Lynn (2003) found similar results.  In a laboratory experiment with monetary 
incentives, taxpayer compliance was positively affected by the taxpayer’s level of moral 
development, value orientation and risk aversion.  Henderson and Kaplan (2005) further 
investigated the relationship between ethical orientation and tax compliance by creating a model 
that included general ethical beliefs as well as contextual ethical beliefs.  They found that 
contextual ethical beliefs (ethical evaluation of others’ compliance decisions) mediate the 
relationship between tax compliance and general ethical beliefs (the subject’s own ethical 
orientation).   
While the above mentioned studies extend the classic economic models based on 
opportunity to evade and penalty by including measures of ethical orientation and moral 
reasoning, a possible limitation is that they assume there is no relationship between the 
opportunity to evade and ethical beliefs.  Blanthorne & Kaplan (2008) argue that taxpayer’s 
ethical beliefs about evasion are shaped, in part, by the individual’s opportunity to evade.  This 
argument is grounded in prior ethics research (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) indicating that 
self-interest influences ethical beliefs.  They postulate that the economic and ethical components 
of the compliance decision should not be treated as independent variables.  Results from their 
study (using structural equation modeling) indicate that social norms, through ethical beliefs, 
have an indirect effect on evasion intention and behaviors.  Self-employed individuals, especially 
those with cash income, have an opportunity to evade taxes due to lack of third party reporting.  
Morse, Karlinksy and Bankman (2009) found cash business tax evasion was attributed primarily 
to norms and opportunity.   
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Risk and Tax Compliance 
In tax research, detection risk is the uncertainty of being audited and fined.  Mixed results 
were found in the early research investigating the influence of detection risk and penalty on tax 
compliance.  This was partly due to the use of inflated audit rates and sanctions in these studies.  
Alm et al. (1992) suggest that audit rates and penalty levels should be set at more realistic 
amounts to better simulate reality.  One other possible explanation for the lack of consensus in 
the early research is that researchers focused on objective audit probabilities set by the 
researcher, rather than on the taxpayer’s perception of detection risk (Carnes & Englebrecht, 
1995).  Sheffrin and Triest (1991) found that taxpayers who perceived higher probabilities of 
detection and penalty reported significantly less tax evasion than those taxpayers who perceived 
detection and penalty to be lower.   
Schauer and Bajor (2007) state that “taxpayers’ perceptions of their detection risk and the 
severity of the associated penalties vary by taxpayer, but these perceptions are much more 
important than real probabilities, for it is their perceptions to which they are reacting” (p. 22).  
Therefore, to increase compliance, one must understand perceived risk of audit and penalty 
rather than the actual rate of audit and penalty set by the researcher or the Internal Revenue 
Service.  Research in other disciplines supports the importance of risk perception.  In a 
management study, March and Shapira (1987) found that managers make a strong distinction 
between gambling (a game of odds that is uncontrollable) and risk taking (in which skill can 
reduce some of the uncertainty and risks can be managed).  Risk-seeking decisions may be 
driven by the perception that the risk is manageable and not just a game of chance. 
Several studies have found significant effects of risk preference and ethical orientations 
on the compliance decision and attempt to explain the interaction/moderation of these two 
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variables (Ghosh & Crain, 1995; Bosco & Mittone, 1997; Trivedi et al., 2003).  Trivedi et al. 
(2003) suggest that risk preference affects compliance directly but also interacts with other 
independent variables (including ethics) in explaining compliance.  Eisenhauer (2008) extended 
this line of research by distinguishing risk aversion from morality using econometric estimates.  
Results of that study suggest that the average level of relative risk aversion would need to be ten 
times larger than most plausible estimates in order to explain actual rates of income tax 
compliance in the absence of ethical standards.  Eisenhauer et al. (2011) study risk aversion and 
ethical orientation using a two-stage model whereby risk aversion is measured in the first stage, 
eliminating the need for joint estimation of risk and ethics.  In their study, risk is measured 
experimentally by asking the subjects to choose to invest in bonds (with a fixed rate of return) or 
in stocks (with an uncertain rate of return).  Although their study contributes to the literature by 
measuring risk behavior (rather than risk attitude or risk perception), it is possible that the 
particular risk behavior measured may apply to the financial domain, but not to the tax 
compliance domain.   
As discussed previously, risk perception is not homogeneous across domains and 
individuals perceive the level of risk to be different in different contexts.  Therefore, measuring a 
specific risk behavior, in this case financial risk, may not be a proper measure for a taxpayer’s 
behavior when faced with the risk of detection of an incorrect return.  Nonetheless, as in other 
studies, Eisenhauer et al. (2011) found a positive correlation between risk aversion and high 
ethical preferences.  Ghosh and Crain (1995) found a significant correlation between risk and 
ethics.  The variables were tested for multicollinearity issues, and no problem was found.  The 
authors suggest that this correlation makes sense intuitively.  Taxpayers with lower ethical 
standards are risking the possibility of being caught (risk seeking). 
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The Tax Preparer and Tax Compliance 
A large body of research finds professionally prepared returns to be more noncompliant 
(Klepper, 1991; Hite & McGill, 1992; Erard, 1993).  There is also limited experimental research 
regarding the tax preparer’s impact on tax compliance.  One explanation for this unexpected 
finding is the dual role that tax preparers must play – the role of the enforcer of the law and 
conversely, the role of the client advocate.  Klepper and Nagin (1989), using IRS TCPM data, 
demonstrate this dual role of preparers.  According to the data analyzed in their study, tax 
preparers contribute to compliance by clarifying ambiguous issues but also contribute to non-
compliance by helping taxpayers take advantage of areas where the tax law is unclear.  When the 
tax law is clear, as is the case for full income disclosure, tax preparers contribute to compliance 
by serving as enforcers of the tax law. 
There is also research regarding taxpayers’ demand for tax advice.  Erard (1993) found 
taxpayers self-select between professionally prepared returns and self-prepared returns based on 
the source of income.  Taxpayers with self-employment income (business, farm, rental and 
royalty) are more likely to use a paid preparer and also exhibit higher non-compliance.  Beck, 
Davis and Jung (1996) also examined the effect of purchasing tax advice.  In their study, they 
found that the demand for tax advice increases with the amount at risk.  Additionally, tax advice 
and amount at risk had an interactive effect on tax reporting.   
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between type of advice (aggressive or 
conservative) and individual tax compliance behavior in an ambiguous tax scenario.  In a survey 
of U.S. taxpayers, Hite and McGill (1992) found that taxpayers tend to disagree with aggressive 
advice and agree with conservative advice.  Tan (1999), using a survey similar to that of Hite and 
McGill (1992), found comparable results for conservative advice.  Subjects agreed more with 
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conservative advice given by tax practitioners, but also agreed less strongly with aggressive 
advice.  Schmidt (2001) extended the previous studies by including prepayment position and 
preparer type (CPA versus non-CPA) in the study.  Results indicated that taxpayers are more 
likely to agree with aggressive advice when the advice is given by a CPA and when the taxpayer 
is in a balance due position.   
It is possible that tax preparers play a far greater role in the tax compliance decision than 
research indicates.  Although prior research has focused on tax preparer “advice” in ambiguous 
tax scenarios, there is a near complete lack of experimental research investigating the effect of 
the preparer on compliance when there isn’t tax ambiguity.  Yet, many taxpayers still choose to 
use a preparer when their tax situation is clear.  Do preparers effectively serve their role as 
enforcers of the “clear” tax law when communicating with their self-employed clients?  Morse 
(2009) points out that the “gatekeeper” regulation by the government (in the form of raising 
return filing standards and disclosure requirements) has little relevance to the issue of 
unambiguous tax situations.   
The existing due diligence requirements of Circular 230 allow preparers to rely on 
taxpayer-provided information unless the preparer has reason to believe that the information 
appears to be incomplete or incorrect.  In a recent field study consisting of nearly 275 interviews 
with cash business owners, bankers, and tax preparers, Morse et al. (2009) discovered that many 
taxpayers and their tax preparers have a “tacit understanding that they will not discuss cash 
income, so as to permit the tax preparer to avoid the uncomfortable question of whether to 
participate in what is plainly an evasion scheme.”  They refer to this as a “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
behavior and note that most preparers interviewed fell into this type of behavior.  
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Summary 
As Black et. al (2012) reported, nearly two-thirds of the net tax gap is associated with 
underreporting of individual income.  Moreover, sixty three percent of the underreporting on 
individual returns stems from underreporting of business and self-employment income.  There is 
a need for continued research to investigate the determinants of individual tax noncompliance, 
specifically related to income not reported to the tax authority by third parties.   
This current study attempts to add to the tax compliance literature by investigating the 
role of the tax preparer in situations where income is not reported to a third party and the tax law 
is unambiguous, yet noncompliance still occurs.  Prior research has identified a relationship 
between the individual tax compliance decision and both risk perception and ethics.  
Additionally, numerous studies have referred to the preparer’s role in tax compliance as a 
position of an enforcer of the tax law when the law is unambiguous and as an advocate for the 
taxpayer when ambiguity exists in the law.  However, nearly all research has focused on the tax 
preparer’s role as an advocate in ambiguous situations.  The role of enforcer and how the tax 
preparer communicates this enforcement has largely been ignored.   
Therefore, the current study contributes to the existing individual tax compliance 
literature by investigating this enforcement role of the tax preparer while also measuring the 
taxpayer’s ethical orientation and risk perception.  The tax preparer’s choice of communication 
(high enforcement communication or low enforcement commnunication) may directly affect the 
compliance decision.  Additionally, when the tax preparer assumes an enforcement role, his or 
her influence may help to overcome a taxpayer’s tendency towards noncompliance due to the 
taxpayer’s ethical orientation and risk perception.  
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This study also adds to the tax compliance literature by investigating the influence of tax 
preparers in unambiguous tax situations in an experimental setting.  In an experimental setting, 
accurate compliance rates can be collected and each variable that affects compliance can be 
identified and controlled for in the experimental design (Alm et al., 2009).  Additionally, this 
study improves upon previous studies by incorporating an income-earning task, rather than 
participant’s receiving an endowment or being given a hypothetical tax scenario.  By having 
participants earn income, the study provides a more realistic representation of self-employment 
income.  Finally, this study improves upon current studies measuring risk by incorporating a 
domain specific risk measurement scale.  Results from this study may not only improve the 
existing individual tax compliance literature, but also can potentially assist policymakers and 
regulators in developing more effective means to increase individual tax compliance.
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III: METHOD 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research hypotheses, explain the 
experimental procedures and provide information regarding the development of the dependent 
and independent variables.  This study utilizes an experiment to examine the impact of three 
independent variables (the preparer’s enforcement role, the taxpayer’s ethical orientation, and the 
taxpayer’s financial risk perception) on the dependent variable - taxpayer compliance.  The 
experiment initially uses a 1x2 between subjects design with the participants randomly assigned 
to either the “high preparer enforcement” treatment group or the “low preparer enforcement” 
treatment group.  The participants are categorized based on their risk perception and ethical 
orientation. Machiavellianism is used as a proxy for ethical orientation.  The participant’s 
financial risk perception score on the DOSPERT instrument measures risk perception.  
Consequently, the final model is a 2x2x2 design with one experimental manipulation and two 
blocked variables. 
Two measures of the dependent variable are used in the study.  First, the dependent 
variable, taxpayer compliance rate, is calculated as a ratio of the participant’s income reported to 
the participant’s actual income from completing the multiplication task.  Additionally, tax 
compliance is measured as a dichotomous variable, grouped by participants who reported the full 
amount of income earned versus participants who reported any amount less than 100% of the 
amount of income earned.  
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Research Hypotheses 
It is possible that tax preparers play a far greater role in the tax compliance decision than 
research indicates.  Although prior research has focused on tax preparer “advice” in ambiguous 
tax scenarios, there is a dearth of experimental research investigating the effect of the preparer on 
compliance when there is no tax ambiguity.  Yet, many taxpayers still choose to use a preparer 
when their tax situation is unambiguous.  Why?  Many self-employed individuals choose to use 
tax preparers because, although the tax law may be clear, the taxpayer needs assistance in 
understanding the tax forms required by the government.  When an individual has business 
income, rather than simply receiving a W2, more information is required by the tax return.  This 
can be an overwhelming task for individuals with little experience in accounting and 
bookkeeping.   
Individuals often make decisions after consulting with and being influenced by others.  
In the real world, few decisions are made in complete isolation.  Harvey and Fisher (1997) model 
advice taking into three components: accepting help, improving judgment, and sharing 
responsibility.  It is possible that, even in situations in which the tax law is unambiguous, some 
taxpayers use a tax preparer not only to receive help and improve judgment but to also “share 
responsibility” of the tax return filing with the tax preparer.  According to Yaniv (2004), “people 
engage in interactive social and cognitive processes of giving and taking advice to enhance their 
representation of a decision problem.”  Therefore, another possible explanation is that 
individuals seek advice from advisors in order to build confidence in their decisions (Heath & 
Gonzalez, 1995) or simply to have a “sounding board.”  
Consequently, the compliance decision of the taxpayer using a preparer may be affected 
by the tax preparer’s communication to the taxpayer.  Perceptions of risk are not formed in total 
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isolation and tax preparers communicate audit risk to their clients and have their own perceptions 
of risk as well.  The preparer’s role in tax compliance, as described in previous research (Klepper 
and Nagin, 1989; Hite and McGill, 1992; Tan, 1999) is the role of an enforcer of the tax law 
when the law is unambiguous and as an advocate for the taxpayer when the law is ambiguous.  
When the tax preparer communicates audit risk and required income disclosure to the taxpayer in 
those situations where the law is unambiguous, the preparer’s enforcement role may be at a low 
level (There is only a 2% chance that your return will be audited by the IRS) or at a high level 
(While there is only a 2% chance your return will be audited by the IRS, you are expected to 
report all income earned).  According to van der Pligt and Eiser (1984), making certain 
characteristics of an issue more salient can influence attitudes and decisions of individuals.  
When tax preparers assume an enforcement role, their influence will likely help to 
overcome taxpayers propensity towards noncompliance due to the influences of the taxpayer’s 
ethical orientation and risk perception.  It is possible that the relationship between risk perception 
and reporting compliance will be moderated by the preparer’s role as an enforcer such that tax 
compliance is increased by the high preparer enforcement treatment and tax compliance is 
decreased by the low preparer enforcement treatment.  While ethical orientation and risk 
perception have been investigated in the tax literature, to the author’s knowledge, there has not 
been a study to date that simultaneously investigates these variables and the role of the tax 
preparer as an enforcer of the law.  The above discussion provides a basis for the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the strength of the enforcement message of 
the preparer and tax compliance: a high preparer enforcement message is associated 
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with a higher rate of tax compliance, and a low preparer enforcement message is 
associated with a lower rate of tax compliance. 
Compliance literature has well documented that ethics plays a part in the tax compliance 
decision and that taxpayers do not base their compliance decisions solely on economic factors.  
Individuals with high ethical standards are more compliant (Reckers et al., 1994; Ghosh & Crain, 
1995; Kaplan et al., 1997; Henderson & Kaplan, 2005; Wenzel, 2005).  This yields the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between ethical orientation and tax compliance: 
individuals with higher ethical reasoning tend to have higher rates of compliance, and 
individuals with lower ethical reasoning tend to have lower rates of compliance. 
Previous research indicates that focusing on the taxpayer’s perception of detection risk, 
rather than objective audit probabilities set by the researcher, may provide a better explanation of 
individual tax compliance (Sheffrin & Triest, 1991; Carnes & Englebrecht, 1995; Schauer & 
Bajor, 2007).  Therefore, to increase compliance, one must understand perceived audit risk and 
penalty rather than the actual rate of audit and penalty set by the researcher or tax authority.  In 
this study, the audit probability is set at 2% for all participants and is not manipulated.  This 
probability percentage was chosen because it represents a reasonable estimate of the number of 
self-employed individual taxpayers audited.  
Additionally, individuals are sometimes inconsistent in their attitudes towards risk across 
different domains and in different situations (Schoemaker, 1990) and individual differences in 
behavior may be attributable to perceived risk rather than risk attitude or risk behavior (Weber & 
Hsee, 1998).  Eisenhauer et al. (2011) measured risk experimentally by asking the subjects to 
choose to invest in bonds (with a fixed rate of return) or in stocks (with an uncertain rate of 
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return).  Although the study contributed to the literature by measuring risk behavior (rather than 
risk attitude or risk perception), it is possible that the risk behavior measured may not apply to 
the tax compliance domain.  If risk perception is not homogeneous across domains and 
individuals perceive the level of risk to be different in different contexts, measuring a specific 
risk behavior, in this case financial risk, may not be a proper measure for a taxpayer’s behavior 
when faced with the risk of detection of an incorrect return.  Weber, Blais and Betz (2002) 
suggest a scale that tests for differences across domains.  They developed the domain specific 
risk attitude scale (DOSPERT), a 40-item scale measuring risk behavior, risk perception and 
expected benefits across five domains.  The five domains are ethical, financial, health/safety, 
social, and recreational domains.  This scale was subsequently refined and updated to a 30-item 
scale to better assess adult populations and different cultures (Blais and Weber, 2006) and 20 of 
the 30 items are used to measure risk perception in this study.  Weber et al. (2002) state the 
following: 
If risk taking is solely assessed for predictive purposes (e.g., to predict how a person or 
group will resolve risky decisions in the future), it may suffice to observe their current 
behavior in that domain and to describe such choices (in a shorthand fashion) as risk 
seeking or risk-averse in the expected-utility sense.  For prediction purposes, it is 
immaterial whether observed behavior is the result of beliefs about the riskiness of the 
choice situation or attitudes towards (perceived) risk.  This distinction becomes 
important, however, when one assesses people’s risk-taking with the goal of changing 
their risk-taking behavior.  Intervention requires knowledge of the processes underlying 
the behavior. (p. 267). 
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This discussion provides a basis for the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between risk perception and tax compliance: 
individuals with higher risk perception tend to have higher rates of  tax compliance, and 
individuals with lower risk perception tend to have lower rates of tax compliance. 
 
Instrument Development 
Task 
Using laboratory experiments has become a widely accepted methodology in tax 
compliance research.  Laboratory experiments have several advantages over other methods.  
First, According to Cadsby, Maynes and Trivedi (2006), the language used in past tax 
experiments (those experiments in which a hypothetical tax scenario was provided and subjects 
were then asked to disclose the amount that he or she would include in income or take as a 
deduction) does not demand compliance as is demanded by a real-world taxing authority.  The 
subject is told that they must pay tax at a stated rate and is given an audit and penalty rate.  While 
some may feel an obligation to pay tax, other subjects may focus on the permission granted by 
the instructions to disclose less than the full amount of income.  This type of task can be viewed 
as an invitation to gamble, unlike an actual tax authority that demands full compliance.  
Furthermore, those types of experiments do not measure actual behavior.  Laboratory 
experiments provide the researcher with a measurement of actual behavior rather than measuring 
the participant’s intention.  Therefore, in the current study, participants’ actual tax-paying 
behavior will be measured using an experimental setting in which participants will receive 
income and be asked to pay a portion of that income as a tax (described as a participation fee). 
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This study uses abstract non-tax language.  In recent years, primarily in economics 
studies, experiments similar to the current study have utilized non-tax language to investigate 
individual income tax compliance (Cadsby et al., 2006; Eisenhauer et al., 2011).  According to 
Alm et al. (1992), a comparison of the use of tax language with neutral language finds no 
significant differences in compliance rates.  They concluded that the failure of tax language to 
affect compliance behavior suggests that using neutral language does not create “missing” 
information in the instructions.  In tax compliance studies, because of social desirability response 
bias, an individual may not report their actual intention out of fear of its social impact.  
Therefore, neutral language is used in this study to maintain experimental control over the 
occurrence of results that could be attributed to social desirability response bias.   
In the current study, the participant earns income by correctly solving a series of 
multiplication problems.  The participant’s task also includes a decision whether or not to 
comply with instructions given by an authority figure, similar to the decision that a taxpayer 
makes. 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire portion of the experiment contains demographic questions as well as 
the Mach IV scale and items from all five domains of the DOSPERT instrument.  The Mach IV 
measures Machiavellianism, which is a proxy for the independent variable of ethical orientation. 
The Domain-specific Risk-attitude scale (DOSPERT) instrument is used to provide a 
measurement of risk perception.  The DOSPERT, developed by Blais and Weber (2006), 
improves upon other risk instruments.  The instrument measures risk perception across five 
different domains and produces a risk perception score for each domain.  The five domains are 
ethical, financial, health/safety, social, and recreational domains.  The financial domain can be 
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further divided into the investing domain and the gambling domain.  In this study, the DOSPERT 
scale is used to measure the risk perception variable on all five domains, but utilizes only 20 of 
the 30 specific statements contained in the instrument.3  Use of this scale improves upon the risk 
measurement of Ghosh and Crain (1995), where the Choice-Dilemma Questionnaire (Kogan & 
Wallach, 1964) was administered.  The Choice-Dilemma Questionnaire produces a composite 
score for several domains rather than a score for each different domain and measures risk 
attitude.  As discussed previously, risk perception is a more relevant measurement variable.  
Inclusion of the DOSPERT instrument also improves upon the Eisenhauer et al. (2011) study by 
measuring perceived risk on five different domains, rather than strictly measuring risk behavior 
on only the financial domain.  
The Mach IV scale measures Machiavellianism, which is used as a proxy for an 
individual’s ethical orientation.  Christie and Geis (1970) define Machiavellianism as “a process 
by which the manipulator gets more of some kind of reward than he would have gotten without 
manipulating, while someone else gets less, at least within the immediate context.”  The Mach 
IV scale, developed in 1970, is a 20-item scale originally developed to measure political 
personality orientation of leaders in organizations (Reimers & Barbuto, 2002).  Participants 
respond to the 20 items using a 7-point Likert scale, with “agree strongly” scored as 7 and 
“disagree strongly” scored as 1.  This scale is a well-validated measure of Machiavellianism and 
has been used extensively in business research (Ghosh & Crain, 1995; McLean & Jones, 1992; 
                                                
3 For this study, ten of the items of the DOSPERT scale were removed after pre-testing. These items related to topics 
that were either irrelevant to the participants or represented topics that were sensitive to the participants. See 
Appendix A for the full DOSPERT scale including the items not included in this study. 
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Murphy, 2012).  The Mach IV scale contains 10 statements phrased in a high Machiavellian 
direction and 10 statements phrased in a low Machiavellian direction.  An example of a “high 
Mach” statement is “It is wise to flatter important people.”  An example of a “low Mach” 
statement is “One should take action only when sure it is morally right.” 
Several demographic variables are included in the questionnaire.  Prior studies in 
individual income tax compliance have found correlations between tax compliance and 
participants’ gender, age, educational level, and marital status.  It is a common finding in tax 
compliance research that females are more compliant than males (Chung and Trivedi, 2003; 
Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001; Scholz & Pinney, 1995; Yeaton & Stellenwerf, 2008).  The age 
of the taxpayer may also provide an explanation for income tax compliance.  Several prior 
studies have found age to have an indirect, positive effect on compliance (Jackson & Milliron, 
1986; Roth et al., 1989; Wenzel, 2002).  Yeaton and Stellenwerf (2008) found that, for younger, 
less educated taxpayers, female taxpayers tend to be more compliant than male taxpayers; but, as 
educational level increases, gender is not a significant predictor of compliance.  Eisenhauer et al. 
(2011) found that married taxpayers display stronger ethical preferences, regarding reporting 
taxable income, than their counterparts.  In light of the previous research, it is important to 
include the participant’s gender, age, and educational level as variables in the questionnaire and 
the analysis.  Marital status is not included in this study because the participants in this study are 
mostly undergraduate business and accounting students, the majority of whom are unmarried. 
Sample 
Participants were recruited from undergraduate business and accounting courses at the 
University of Mississippi.  The use of students as surrogates for taxpayers is justified by previous 
research.  According to an analysis of accounting literature by Ashton and Kramer (1980), 
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students and nonstudents make similar decisions in studies involving decision-making.  Hite 
(1988) tests for correlations between government reported statistics and taxpayer’s self-reported 
compliance rates on hypothetical reporting decisions.  She finds that the hypothetical responses 
of students are significantly correlated to actual government compliance figures.  White et al. 
(1993) further investigated the use of students as surrogates for taxpayers in a study testing the 
impact of tax withholding on taxpayer compliance.  Results of their study indicate that the tax 
compliance behavior of undergraduate students is similar to that of adult taxpayers, although 
adult taxpayers are more likely to claim an unsupported deduction than are undergraduate 
business students.  In a more recent study, Alm, Bloomquist and McKee (2015) compared the tax 
compliance decision-making of students in laboratory experiments to those decisions made by 
taxpayers (using a special data set from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service) and also to the 
decisions made by nonstudents in the laboratory.  Their findings indicate that data from the 
laboratory is similar to data in the field and that students and nonstudents exhibit similar 
decision-making. 
Potential participants were given the opportunity to volunteer for the study and were told 
that they would receive compensation for participation in the study.  One hundred and seventy 
accounting and business students participated in the research sessions.  Students were invited by 
their professors to participate in the study and were told to send an email to the researcher if 
interested in participating.  Those students who emailed the researcher received a response 
indicating the date and time to arrive at the lab to participate in the study.  Of the 170 
participants, one participant’s data were eliminated from the analysis, because that participant 
reported a higher income than was actually earned and paid a higher tax than was actually 
required, which indicates that the participant did not fully understand the instructions.  This left a 
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sample of n=169 participants.  Table 3-1 provides descriptive statistics of the participants in the 
study. 
 
Table 3-1. Summary of Participant Demographics (N = 169) 
    Mean Std Deviation   Gender/Education Lvl %   
Age 
 
21.25 1.68 
   
       Gender 
      Male 
    
50.90% 
 Female 
    
49.10% 
 
       Education Level 
     Lower Undergraduate 
   
24.30% 
 Upper Undergraduate 
   
73.40% 
 Graduate       2.40%   
 
Implementation  
Data Collection 
Participants were given a specific time to arrive at the lab to complete the study.  As the 
participants arrived, they were given an envelope labeled with an identification number.  The 
envelope contained an instruction card and earnings form to be used in the last phase of the 
experiment.  After receiving the ID envelope, each participant was taken to the testing room one 
by one in the order of arrival, to ensure a quiet testing environment.  Additionally, this system 
allowed the lab assistant to verify that the participant was seated and that the program on the 
participant’s screen functioned properly.  Once seated, the participants entered their 
identification numbers on the screen and received instructions explaining that they were 
participating in a study of behavior regarding decision-making under uncertainty.  The 
experiment consisted of three phases. 
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After reading the instructions, phase one of the experiment began.  This portion contained 
the Mach IV scale (20 items), 20 items from the risk perception scale of the DOSPERT 
instrument, and five demographic questions (described in detail in the next section).  The 
participants were given 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire.  After the participant had 
answered all 45 questions and 15 minutes had passed, the second phase of the experiment began.  
Participants were given instructions (on screen) regarding the multiplication task.  The 
multiplication task consisted of fifteen (15) multiplication problems.  Each participant was given 
12 minutes to hand-calculate the multiplication task.  Participants were compensated $2 for every 
correct solution they were able to provide in the 12 minute time period.  Participants were 
provided with a scratch piece of paper and a pencil.  At the end of the 12-minute period, the 
computer screen provided the participant with a score.  The score is the number of correct 
solutions entered during the task.  At this point, the instructions on the screen prompted the 
participant to raise his or her hand to signal to the lab assistant that he/she had completed the 
task.  The on-screen instructions also advised the participant to remove the “instruction card” 
from his/her envelope and to begin reading the instructions for the next phase of the experiment.  
The lab assistant then came to the participant’s computer, wrote down the compensation owed to 
the participant, and retrieved the participant’s compensation from the pay desk.  
Total compensation consisted of $2 times the number of correct multiplication solutions.  
Therefore, each participant could potentially earn between $0 and $30 during the second phase 
of the experiment.  The multiplication task score of each participant was reported to the server 
located at the pay desk, so that the lab assistant was able to verify (by identification number) the 
number of problems answered correctly and correctly calculate each participant’s income.  This 
actual earnings number serves as the denominator when calculating the tax compliance rate, 
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which is one of the dependent variable measures in this study.   
Table 3-2 provides a summary of the performance of participants on the income-earning 
task.  The experiment consisted of four separate research sessions.  The research sessions took 
place on May 20, May 29, June 29, and September 11 of 2014 in the Mississippi Experimental 
Research Laboratory, a computerized research facility located in Conner Hall on the University 
of Mississippi campus.  A pilot session took place on April 28th to test the instrument and 
experimental procedures.  
Table 3-2. Mean Compensation by Session 
Session n Mean ($) Std Dev ($) 
Session 1 38 20.58 7.217 
Session 2 67 19.82 8.118 
Session 3 23 18.96 8.155 
Session 4 41 22.83 5.899 
     Overall 169 20.60 7.495 
 
 After the lab assistant had compensated the participant, the participant was escorted from 
the lab to one of three “tax reporting” rooms to begin phase three of the experiment.  Phase three 
of the experiment was the only manipulation in this study and involved the tax preparer’s 
communication of both audit risk and income disclosure to the taxpayer.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three “tax reporting” rooms.  In each room, the “tax preparer” 
assisted participants whose instructions contained the “high preparer enforcement message” as 
well as participants whose instructions contained the “low preparer enforcement message.”  
Multiple reporting rooms were used to enable all participants to complete the entire process in a 
timely manner and to eliminate a backup of participants waiting to report their earnings.  In each 
“tax reporting” room, one of three “tax preparers” was seated at a desk with a chair in front of 
the desk intended for the participant.  After the participant was seated, the tax preparer asked the 
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participant to remove his/her instruction card from the envelope and the tax preparer read the 
instructions aloud as the participant read along silently.  The instruction card (inside the 
participant’s ID envelope) contained either the “high preparer enforcement message” or the “low 
preparer enforcement message.”  Participants whose ID ended in an even number had instruction 
cards containing the “high preparer enforcement message” while participants whose ID ended in 
an odd number had instruction cards containing the “low preparer enforcement message.”  After 
the instructions were read aloud, the participant reported earnings by writing a number on the 
earnings form and the participation fee was calculated.  At that time, the participant gave the 
amount of money (the calculated fee) to the preparer.  The preparer placed this fee and the 
earnings form in the brown envelope and handed the envelope back to the participant.  The 
participant then took the envelope and dropped it in a box outside of the door of the room.  In the 
instructions to the earnings form, the participants received information regarding the potential for 
an audit of their reported earnings.  The instructions explained that there was a chance that some 
of the forms would be checked and that if checked and found to be noncompliant, the participant 
would be required to pay the shortfall plus a penalty equal to 1.5 times the shortfall.   
The random audit selection was made by use of a bingo cage containing forty nine white 
balls and one red ball.  The participant spun the cage.  If a white ball was dispensed, the 
participant’s earning form was not checked and the participant was allowed to leave the 
experiment.  If the red ball was dispensed, the participant was audited.  An escort took the 
participant to a separate room where the earnings form was checked against the earnings 
recorded by the computer.  If the reported earnings were less than actual earnings, the participant 
would be required to pay the shortfall plus a penalty equal to 1.5 times the shortfall.  Five 
participants were actually audited and all audited participants were found to be compliant 
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(although this study does not attempt to use audit rate as a predictive factor of tax reporting 
compliance).   
Variable Descriptions 
 This research investigates the effect on tax compliance of three independent variables.  
The first independent variable in the analyses for hypotheses H1 through H3 is the preparer 
enforcement communication (PFORCE).  Participants are randomly assigned to either the high 
preparer enforcement treatment or the low preparer enforcement treatment.  When the tax 
preparer communicates audit risk and required income disclosure to the taxpayer in those 
situations where the law is unambiguous, the preparer’s enforcement role may be at a high level.  
An example of a high enforcement message is “While there is only a 2% chance your return will 
be audited by the IRS, you are expected to report all income earned.”  However, the tax preparer 
could give a low enforcement message.  For example, if the tax preparer said, “There is only a 
2% chance that your return will be audited by the IRS,” this would be considered a low 
enforcement message.  Eighty-seven participants received the high enforcement message and 82 
participants received the low enforcement message.  It is important to note that this study does 
not attempt to explain the rationale for the tax preparer’s choice of high or low enforcement 
communication.  Rather, this study examines the effect of communication type on the individual 
taxpayer compliance decision. 
The ethical orientation (ETHICS) of the taxpayer is also included as an independent 
variable in this study.  The 20-item Mach IV instrument measures Machiavellianism tendencies 
and serves as a proxy for ethical orientation.  Each item of the Mach IV instrument produces a 
score from 1 to 5; therefore, each participant has a total score from 20 to 100.  Ten of the 20 
items are reverse coded (See Appendix A for the specific coding required).  The ETHICS 
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variable was computed by adding all 20-item scores together.  High and low ethical orientation 
groups were created by dividing the ETHICS score at the median.  Scores at or below the median 
were labeled "high ethical reasoning" and scores above the median were labeled “low ethical 
reasoning.”  Eighty-seven participants scored at or below the median (high ethical reasoning) and 
82 participants scored above the median (low ethical reasoning).  Table 3-3 provides the 
descriptive statistics for the ETHICS variable prior to dividing the variable into two groups. 
The third independent variable is the financial risk perception (PER_RISK) of the 
participant.  The participants completed 20 risk perception items in the questionnaire.  The items 
were taken from the domain specific risk attitude scale (DOSPERT) developed by Weber, Blais 
and Betz (2002).  The scale measures risk perception on five domains: ethical, financial, 
health/safety, social, and recreational domains.  The measurement properties of the DOSPERT 
scale have been tested in other fields; however, the scale has not previously been used in a tax 
compliance study.  The PER_RISK variable is the sum of the four financial items added 
together. Each of the financial items produces a score from 1 to 7; therefore, each participant has 
a total score from 4 to 28.  This variable was then divided into two groups by splitting the 
participants’ scores at the median into low and high categories.  Scores at or below the median 
were labeled "low risk perception" and scores above the median were labeled “high risk 
perception.”  Ninety-six participants scored at or below the median (low risk perception) and 73 
participants scored above the median (high risk perception).  Table 3-3 provides the descriptive 
statistics for the PER_RISK variable prior to dividing the variable into two groups. 
Table 3-3. Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
n Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
ETHICS 169 42 77 59.4852 6.04360 
PER_RISK 169 7 28 18.7160 3.66317 
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Data collected also includes items regarding gender, age, educational level and 
compensation earned.  Prior research has shown that gender, age, and educational level are all 
indicators of a taxpayer’s decision to comply with U.S. tax laws.  The gender variable 
(GENDER) is dummy coded as male “0” and female “1.”  Educational level (EDLVL) is a 
categorical variable and is divided into three groups: lower undergraduate (freshmen and 
sophomores), upper undergraduate (juniors and seniors), and graduate (post undergraduate).  The 
participant’s age serves as the measurement for the age (AGE) variable.  Additionally, the 
amount of compensation earned by the participant (COMP) is included in the analysis as a 
control variable.  These four variables serve as control variables in the analyses presented in 
Chapter IV. 
Table 3-4. Variable Descriptions 
COMPLY = The ratio of the income self-reported to the total true income earned  
ABSCOMPLY = Grouped as either “100% compliant” or “less than 100% compliant” in reporting true income 
PFORCE = The message given by the tax preparer – either a high preparer enforcement message or a low preparer enforcement message 
PER_RISK = Score on the four items from the financial domain of the DOSPERT scale, split into low risk perception and high risk perception groups 
ETHICS = Score on the Mach IV instrument and split into high ethical orientation and low ethical orientation groups 
GENDER = Whether participant is male/female 
AGE = Age of the participant 
EDLVL = Education level of the participant – either lower undergraduate, upper undergraduate or graduate  
COMP = Actual dollar amount of compensation earned by participant 
 
Two measures of the dependent variable are used in this study.  First, the dependent 
variable (COMPLY) is the ratio of the income self-reported to the total true income earned from 
completing the multiplication task.  Self-reported income, rather than tax paid on reported 
income, is used as the numerator in the compliance ratio because the participants were only able 
to “cheat” on the amount of income that they disclosed on the earnings form.  While the 
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researcher had the ability to track the income earned through the electronic data gathering 
process, the tax preparer did not have a record of the actual income earned by the participant.  
Once the participant disclosed income, the tax required on the amount of self-reported income 
was placed in the envelope in the presence of the preparer.  This variable serves as the dependent 
variable in the statistical tests using ANOVA and ANCOVA.  The overall mean for the 
compliance variable for the 169 participants was 0.841 (84.1%) with a standard deviation of 
0.318.   
Figure 3-1. Self-Reported Earnings by Percentage Reported 
 
Figure 3-1 displays self-reported earnings by the percentage of earnings reported in 
relation to total earnings.  This graph visually reveals that the data are bimodal, meaning that 
most participants in the study were either fully compliant or fully non-compliant (the compliance 
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data are clustered at the tails).  Therefore, an additional dependent variable is measured to 
analyze absolute tax compliance.  For this variable (ABSCOMPLY), the data is separated into 
two groups: (1) participants who reported the full amount of income earned, and (2) participants 
who reported any amount less than 100% of the amount of income earned.  This variable serves 
as the dependent variable in the Chi Square tests and logistic regression.  Overall, 126 of the 169 
(or 74.6%) participants were fully compliant.  A total of 43 of the 169 (25.4%) were not 
compliant.  Table 3-4 provides a summary of the variables discussed above. 
Summary 
This chapter presented research beneficial in developing three tax compliance 
hypotheses.  These hypotheses were developed to test the effects of the tax preparer’s 
enforcement role, taxpayer ethical orientation, and taxpayer risk perception on individual income 
tax compliance.  The instrument development and task are also discussed extensively.  Lastly, 
this chapter includes a detailed section explaining the variables in the study and provides a brief 
discussion of the statistical analyses used to test the data.  Chapter IV presents the detailed 
analyses, including analyses of variance, a three-way analysis of covariance, chi square goodness 
of fit tests and a logistic regression used to examine the relationship between tax compliance and 
the independent variables. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data analysis procedures and to present the 
results of the research.  The chapter provides descriptive and univariate analyses of the data. 
Additionaly, this chapter includes the results of factorial ANCOVA and logistic regression used 
to analyze the interaction effects of the independent variables.  For reference, the three research 
hypotheses are restated here: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the strength of the enforcement message of 
the preparer and tax compliance: a high preparer enforcement message is associated 
with a higher rate of tax compliance, and a low preparer enforcement message is 
associated with a lower rate of tax compliance. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between ethical orientation and tax compliance: 
individuals with higher ethical reasoning tend to have higher rates of tax compliance, 
and individuals with lower ethical reasoning tend to have lower rates of  tax compliance. 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between risk perception and tax compliance: 
individuals with higher risk percecption tend to have higher rates of  tax compliance, and 
individuals with lower risk perception tend to have lower rates of tax compliance.
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Variables, Measurements, and Sample 
Hypotheses H1 through H3 are tested by ANOVA (tax compliance rate) and chi square 
(absolute tax compliance).  An alpha level of .05 is used for all statistical tests in this study.  
One-sided hypotheses are stated and tested for a significant relationship between tax compliance 
(rate and absolute) and a high preparer enforcement message (H1), high ethical reasoning of the 
taxpayer (H2), and high risk perception of the taxpayer (H3).  Additionally, ANCOVA and 
logistic regression are used to evaluate possible interaction effects between the independent 
variables. No hypotheses have been made regarding interactions between the independent 
variables, therefore the interactions use two-tailed significance value. 
 
Table 4-1. Summary Description of Dependent, Independent and Control variables 
COMPLY = The ratio of the income self-reported to the total true income earned  
ABSCOMPLY = Coded 1 for 100% compliant and 0 for less than 100% compliant 
PFORCE = Coded 1 for high preparer enforcement and 2 for low preparer enforcement 
PER_RISK = Coded 1 for low risk perception and 2 for high risk perception 
ETHICS = Coded 1 for high ethical orientation and 2 for low ethical orientation 
GENDER = Coded 1 for female; 0 for male 
AGE = 2014 – Birth Year 
EDLVL = Coded 1 for Lower Undergraduate; 2 for Upper Undergraduate and 3 for Graduate  
COMP = Actual dollar amount of compensation earned by participant 
 
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the dependent, independent and control variables 
included in the analyses.  Two measures of the dependent variable are used in the study.  First, 
the dependent variable (COMPLY) is the ratio of the income self-reported to the total true 
income earned from completing the multiplication task.  This variable serves as the dependent 
variable in the statistical tests using ANOVA and ANCOVA.  Additionally, tax compliance is 
measured as a dichotomous variable.  ABSCOMPLY is coded as “1” for participants who 
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reported the full amount of income earned and “0” for participants who reported any amount less 
than 100% of the amount of income earned.  This variable serves as the dependent variable in the 
chi square tests and logistic regression.  Overall, 126 of the 169 (or 74.6%) participants were 
fully compliant.  A total of 43 of the 169 (25.4%) were not compliant. 
The analyses include three independent variables.  The first independent variable is 
PFORCE.  This variable represents the enforcement message of the preparer and was 
manipulated at two levels – high preparer enforcement and low preparer enforcement.  Recall 
from the previous section that each participant was escorted to one of three “tax reporting” 
rooms.  In each “tax reporting” room, a tax preparer read the preparer message aloud as the 
participant read along silently.  The tax preparer ensured that the participant understood the 
instructions and then directed the participant to report his or her earnings and participation fee on 
the earnings form and place the earnings form and fee in the envelope.  Participants whose ID 
ended in an even number had instruction cards containing the “high preparer enforcement 
message” while participants whose ID ended in an odd number had instruction cards containing 
the “low preparer enforcement message.”  Participants who received the “high preparer 
enforcement message” received a score of “1” for the variable, while participants who received 
the “low preparer enforcement message” were given a score of “2.” Eighty-two participants 
received the low preparer enforcement message, while 87 participants received the high preparer 
enforcement message. 
The second independent variable, ETHICS, represents the ethical orientation of the 
taxpayer.  The 20-item Mach IV instrument measures Machiavellianism tendencies and serves as 
a measure of ethical orientation.  High and low ethical orientation groups were created by 
dividing the total ETHICS score at the median.  Scores below the median were labeled "high 
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ethical orientation" and scores above the median were labeled “low ethical orientation.”  High 
ethical orientation is coded as “1” and low ethical orientation is coded as “2.” Eighty-seven 
participants scored below the median (high ethical orientation) and 82 participants scored above 
the median (low ethical orientation). 
The final independent variable included in the analyses is the taxpayer’s financial risk 
perception (PER_RISK).  The participants completed 20 risk perception items in the 
questionnaire.  The items were taken from the domain specific risk attitude scale (DOSPERT) 
developed by Weber, Blais and Betz (2002).  The scale measures risk perception on five 
domains: ethical, financial, health/safety, social, and recreational domains and contains 4 items 
for each domain.  In the analyses in this study, the domain of interest is the financial domain4.  
Therefore, the PER_RISK variable is the sum of the four items of the financial domain added 
together.  This variable was then divided into two groups by splitting the participants’ scores at 
the median into low and high categories.  Scores below the median were labeled "low risk 
perception" and scores above the median were labeled “high risk perception.”  Ninety-six 
participants scored below the median  (low risk perception) and 73 participants scored above the 
median (high risk perception). 
The questionnaire also includes demographic items used as control variables in the 
analysis.  The gender variable (GENDER) is dummy coded as male “0” and female “1.”  
                                                
4 Results of a one-way ANOVA with the dependent variable COMPLY and the independent variable 
TOTAL_PER_RISK are provided in Appendix D.  The inclusion of the financial risk perception variable 
(PER_RISK) rather than a total risk perception measure (TOTAL_PER_RISK) results in a better model of tax 
compliance.  
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Educational level (EDLVL) is a categorical variable coded as lower undergraduate “1,” upper 
undergraduate “2,” and graduate “3.”  The participant’s age serves as the measurement for the 
age (AGE) variable. Additionally, the amount of compensation earned by the participant 
(COMP) is included in the analysis as a control variable.    
Demographics 
Descriptive statistics for the demographic variables are reported in Table 3-2.  In the full 
data set, approximately 51% of the participants were male and 49% of the participants were 
female.  The mean age of the participants was 21.25 years and most participants were upper-
undergraduate students (73%).  The mean compensation earned by the participants was $20.60.  
In an effort to control for any potential influence of demographic variables, gender 
(GENDER), age (AGE), education level (EDLVL) and compensation (COMP) were included in 
separate one-way ANOVAs (for gender and educational level) and linear regression models (for 
age and compensation) with tax compliance (COMPLY) as the dependent variable and the single 
demographic variable as the independent variable (predictor).  Additionally, chi square goodness 
of fit tests were performed to test the relationship between absolute tax compliance 
(ABSCOMPLY) and the categorical demographic variables (gender and education level) in the 
study.  Binary logistic regression was used to test the relationship between absolute compliance 
and the continuous demographic variables (age and compensation).  None of the control 
variables were found to be significantly correlated with the tax compliance. 
Analysis of Variance 
Assumptions of ANOVA 
Univariate analysis is used to test the three research hypotheses with regard to the 
percentage of compliance (COMPLY).  Using ANOVA, hypotheses H1-H3 examine the effects 
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of preparer enforcement communication (H1), ethical orientation (H2), and risk perception (H3) 
on tax compliance rates.  Differences, if found, indicate that individual differences in risk 
perception and ethical orientation, as well as the enforcement role of the preparer, influence 
individual tax compliance rates.  For ANOVA to be appropriate for data analysis for this study, 
several assumptions must be addressed.  The first assumption is independence of observations.  
Each participant in this study completed the session one time, therefore the independence 
assumption is met. 
The second assumption to address is the normality of the dependent variable.  In order to 
check this assumption, the Shapiro-Wilk test is used.  Results of this test indicated data are not 
normally distributed (p-value <.001).  Because most participants in the study were either fully 
compliant or fully non-compliant, the data are bimodal (meaning that the compliance data is 
clustered at the tails).  In this situation, ANOVA can be used even though the assumption of 
normality is violated.  If the violation is caused by heavier tails, rather than heavy skewness of 
the data, ANOVA is considered to be robust to the violation (Becker, 1998; Pyzdek 2009). 
Table 4-2. Pearson/Spearman Correlation Coefficients   
 
COMPLY 
ABS 
COMPLY PFORCE 
ETHIC
S 
PER_FIN
_RISK GENDER 
COMPLY 1.000 0.859** -0.130 -0.125 0.013 0.107 
ABSCOMPLY 0.986** 1.000 -0.140 -0.140 0.016 0.139 
PFORCE -0.138 -0.140 1.000 0.076 0.133 0.041 
ETHICS -0.144 -0.140 0.076 1.000 -0.082 -0.125 
PER_FIN_RISK 0.012 0.016 0.133 -0.082 1.000 0.147 
GENDER 0.131 0.139 0.041 -0.125 0.147 1.000 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal. 
 Variable definitions are provided in Table 3-4. 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01level (2-tailed).   
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The assumption of equality of variance of the cells must also be considered when using 
ANOVA.  Levene’s test indicated that that cells do not appear to meet this assumption (p-value < 
.001).  When the equal variance assumption is violated, specifically when cell sizes are not 
approximately equal, an adjusted F statistic should be used.  The adjusted F statistic for each 
analysis is provided by the Welch test.  Correlations among the dependent variable and 
independent variables are examined prior to performing the ANOVA.  Pearson and Spearman 
correlations of the variables included in H1 through H3 are presented in Table 4-2.  Examination 
of the correlation coefficients shows that the independent variables (PFORCE, ETHICS and 
PER_RISK) are not statistically correlated to one another at the 1% level. 
Effect Size 
The effect size measure evaluates the portion of total variation in the dependent variable 
that can be attributed to a particular independent variable.  It is important to examine effect size, 
because an analysis can almost always reach statistical significance if there is a large enough 
sample.  Furthermore, even a large effect may not be statistically significant if the sample size is 
too small.  Therefore, for any analysis showing statistical significance, effect size should be 
measured.  Eta squared, partial eta squared, and omega squared are three common effect size 
measures used with ANOVA.  With small samples sizes, partial eta squared and eta squared can 
provide biased measures.  However, omega squared provides an unbiased effect size measure.  
For this reason, omega squared will be presented for any significant effects found in the analysis 
(See Test of H1- ANOVA and Additional Analysis sections in this chapter). 
Test of H1 - ANOVA 
For hypotheses H1 through H3, the dependent variable (COMPLY) is measured as the 
ratio of the income self-reported to the total true income earned from completing the 
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multiplication task. Using a one-way ANOVA, hypothesis H1 is analyzed for a relationship 
between reporting compliance (COMPLY) and the enforcement communication of the preparer 
(PFORCE).  For data analysis purposes, the high preparer enforcement treatment is coded as “1” 
and the low preparer enforcement treatment is coded as “0.”  The findings (Welch F(1,167) = 
2.825, p = .048) support hypothesis H1 and indicate that there is a statistically significant 
difference in compliance for the low preparer enforcement group (mean M = .798) versus the 
high preparer enforcement group (M = .881) (See Table 4-3).  The direction of the relationship 
indicates that compliance is higher when an individual receives the high enforcement 
communication than when an individual receives the low enforcement communication.  The 
effect size of the significant main effect is measured by the omega squared statistic.  For the 
relationship between high preparer enforcement and tax compliance, omega squared is equal to 
.01.5  According to Cohen, an omega-squared value between .01 and .0599 represents a small 
effect, indicating that only a small amount of the variance in tax compliance is accounted for by 
the preparer enforcement message. 
Test of H2 - ANOVA 
In order to test hypothesis H2 regarding the relationship between tax compliance and the 
ethical orientation of the taxpayer, a one-way ANOVA examines the relationship between 
reporting compliance (COMPLY) and the ethical orientation of the taxpayer (ETHICS).  The 
independent variable, ETHICS, represents the ethical orientation of the taxpayer.  As previously 
stated, compliance (COMPLY) is measured as the ratio of the income self-reported to the total 
true income earned from completing the multiplication task.  The findings (Welch F(1,167) = 
                                                
5 The formula for calculating omega squared is SSeffect - (dfeffect)(MSerror)/ MSerror + SStotal 
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2.604, p = .055) only marginally support hypothesis H2 and indicate that individuals with a high 
ethical orientation are not statistically significantly more compliant (at p < .05) (See Table 4-3).  
However, the direction of the relationship indicates that compliance is higher for individuals in 
the high ethical orientation group (M = .878) than for individuals in the low ethical orientation 
group (M = .800).6  
Table 4-3. Mean Tax Compliance (COMPLY) for Independent Variables 
Variable Group  Mean (M) 
Std. 
Dev. Welch F 
p-value 
(1-
tailed) 
PFORCE Low 0.798 0.288 2.825 0.048 High 0.881 0.345 
ETHICS Low Ethics 0.800 0.353 2.604 0.055 
High Ethics 0.878 0.279 
PER_RISK Low Risk 0.837 0.373 0.028 0.433 
High Risk 0.846 0.312 
 
Test of H3 - ANOVA 
 In order to test hypothesis H3 regarding the relationship between tax compliance 
(COMPLY) and the perceived financial risk of the taxpayer (PER_RISK), a one-way ANOVA is 
used.  The findings (Welch F(1,167) = 0.028, p = .433) fail to support hypothesis H3 and 
                                                
6 The effect size of the marginal support for H2 is measured by the omega squared statistic.  For the relationship 
between high ethical reasoning and tax compliance, omega squared is equal to .01.  According to Cohen, an omega-
squared value between .01 and .0599 represents a small effect, meaning only a small amount of the variance in tax 
compliance is accounted for by ethical orientation. 
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indicate that individuals with high risk perception are not statistically significantly more  
compliant than individuals with low risk perception (See Table 4-3).7 
Tests of Compliance Measured in Absolute Terms 
Assumptions of Chi Square 
Recall that compliance was also measured in absolute terms.  Specifically, participants 
were categorized as fully compliant or non-compliant.  Chi square goodness of fit tests are 
performed to test the relationship between absolute tax compliance (ABSCOMPLY) and the 
independent variables in the study.  Pearson's chi-squared test (χ2) is a statistical test applied to 
sets of categorical data to evaluate how likely it is that any observed difference between the sets 
is due to chance.  For chi square to be appropriate in analysis of the dependent variable, 
ABSCOMPLY, two assumptions must be addressed.  The first assumption is independence of 
observations.  Each participant in this study completed the session one time, therefore the 
independence assumption is met.  The second assumption is that each group in each variable 
should have a minimum expected frequency of 5.  SPSS provides verification that this 
assumption is met for the analyses of H1 through H3. 
Effect Size 
As discussed in the ANOVA section, effect size should be measured for any analysis 
showing statistical significance.  The effect size measure evaluates the portion of total variation 
                                                
7 Results of a one-way ANOVA with the dependent variable COMPLY and the independent variable 
TOTAL_PER_RISK are presented in Appendix D.  The inclusion of the financial risk perception variable 
(PER_RISK) rather than a total risk perception measure (TOTAL_PER_RISK) results in a better model of tax 
compliance.  
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in the dependent variable that can be attributed to a particular independent variable.  It is 
important to examine effect size, because an analysis can almost always reach statistical 
significance if there is a large enough sample.  For the chi-square analysis, Cramer’s V was used 
to measure the magnitude of the effect size (See Test of H1 - Chi Square and Test of H2 – Chi 
Square in this section). 
Test of H1 – Chi Square 
For hypotheses H1-H3, the data was divided into “100% compliant” and “Less than 
100% compliant to examine (1) the percentage of absolute compliance and (2) the relationship 
between absolute compliance and each of the independent variables.  
To test the relationship between absolute tax compliance (ABSCOMPLY) and the 
enforcement message of the preparer (PFORCE), a chi square goodness of fit test was calculated 
comparing the actual occurrence of absolute tax compliance for the high preparer enforcement 
group to the expected occurrence.  The dependent variable is measured as “100% compliant” or 
“Less than 100% compliant.”  For the high preparer enforcement group, only 19.5% (17/87) of 
individuals were noncompliant (meaning the individual either reported zero income or reported 
an amount less than actually earned).  However, for the low preparer enforcement group, 31.7% 
(26/82) of individuals were noncompliant (See Table 4-4).  
Table 4-4.  Contingency Table for Tax Compliance and Preparer Enforcement Message 
   Message Type   
Tax Compliance   High Enforcement   Low Enforcement   Total 
100 % compliant  70 (80.5%)  56 (68.3%)  126 
Less than 100% compliant 17 (19.5%)  26 (31.7%)  43 
Total     87 (100%)   82 (100%)   169 
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Results of the chi square goodness of fit test indicate that there is a statistically significant 
occurrence of absolute tax compliance for participants receiving the high enforcement message 
(χ2 = 3.294, p = .035).  In addition, effect size was computed to qualify the chi-square test 
results. For the chi-square analysis, the magnitude of the effect size was measured using 
Cramer’s V (V = 0.1395).  According to Cramer, for df = 1, 0.10 indicates a small effect, 0.30 
indicates a medium effect, and 0.50 represents a large effect.  Therefore, the significant results of 
the chi square goodness of fit in this analysis indicate a small effect size for the occurrence of 
absolute compliance for the high preparer enforcement group. 
Test of H2 – Chi Square 
To test the relationship between absolute tax compliance (COMPLY) and the ethical 
orientation of the taxpayer (ETHICS), a chi square goodness of fit test was calculated comparing 
the actual occurrence of absolute tax compliance for the high ethical reasoning group to the 
expected occurrence.  
Table 4-5. Contingency Table for Tax Compliance and Ethical Orientation 
 Ethical Orientation   
Tax Compliance High Ethical Reasoning   
Low Ethical 
Reasoning   Total 
100 % compliant 70 (80.5%)  56 (68.3%)  126 
Less than 100% compliant 17 (19.5%)  26 (31.7%)  43 
Total 87 (100%)   82 (100%)   169 
 
Results of the chi square goodness of fit test indicate that there is a statistically significant 
occurrence of absolute tax compliance for participants in the low ethical reasoning group (χ2 = 
3.294, p = .035).  For the high ethical reasoning group, 80.5% (70/87) of individuals were 
compliant (meaning the individual reported all income earned).  However, for the low ethical 
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reasoning group, only 68.3% (56/82) of individuals were compliant (See Table 4-5). The effect 
size was evaluated to further investigate the chi-square test results. For the chi-square analysis, 
the magnitude of the effect size was measured using Cramer’s V (V = 0.1395).  According to 
Cramer, for df = 1, 0.10 indicates a small effect, 0.30 indicates a medium effect, and 0.50 
represents a large effect.  Therefore, the significant results of the chi square goodness of fit in 
this analysis indicate a small effect size for the occurrence of absolute compliance for the high 
ethical reasoning group.8 
Test of H3 – Chi Square 
In order to further address the relationship between tax compliance (ABSCOMPLY) and 
perceived financial risk of the taxpayer, a chi square goodness of fit test was calculated 
comparing the actual occurrence of absolute tax compliance for the high financial risk perception 
group to the expected occurrence.  The dependent variable is measured as “100% compliant” or 
“Less than 100% compliant.”  Participants categorized as having low financial risk perception 
and participants categorized as having high financial risk perception were not statistically 
significantly different in their compliance decision (χ2 = 0.042, p = .838).  Specifically, for the 
low financial risk perception group, 26.0% (25/71) of individuals were noncompliant and for the 
high risk perception group, 24.7% (18/73) of individuals were noncompliant (See Table 4-6).  
 
 
                                                
8 Appendix C provides documentation regarding the frequencies of PFORCE and ETHICS for absolute tax 
compliance. Results of the chi square goodness of fit tests for both variables resulted in identical contingency tables; 
however, this is purely coincidental. 
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Table 4-6. Contingency Table for Tax Compliance and Perceived Financial Risk 
  Perceived Financial Risk   
Tax Compliance  Low Risk Perception  High Risk Perception  Total 
100 % compliant  71 (74.0%)  55 (75.3%)  126 
Less than 100% compliant  25 (26.0%)  18 (24.7%)  43 
Total   96 (100%)   73 (100%)   169 
 
 
 
Additional Analyses – Factorial ANCOVA & Logistic Regression 
Factorial ANCOVA 
To further test tax compliance, specifically for possible interactions between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, COMPLY, a three way (PFORCE  x  ETHICS 
x  PER_RISK) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted on participants' tax reporting 
decision, controlling for GENDER.  ANCOVA has the same assumptions of ANOVA and two 
additional assumptions – (1) independence of the covariate and treatment effect, and (2) 
homogeneity of regression slopes (Field, 2013).  To check the assumption of the independence of 
the covariate and treatment effect, the covariate, GENDER, was analyzed as the dependent 
variable in a regression with the three independent variables.  Results of the regression indicate 
that PFORCE, ETHICS, and PER_RISK are not predictors of gender. Therefore, the assumption 
is not violated.  To test the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes, an additional 
analysis is conducted with an added interaction term between the covariate and the highest-level 
interaction. This interaction is insignificant and indicates that the assumption of homogeneity of 
regression slopes has not been violated.   
Prior research has shown that gender, age, and educational level are all indicators of a 
taxpayer’s decision to comply with U.S. tax laws.  Harris, Jenkins, and Glaser (2006) found that, 
in financial domains, females, over males, tend to have a lower engagement rate in risky 
activities and they judge negative events more likely.  Additionally, research suggests 
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relationships between gender and ethical orientation (Eisenhauer et al., 2011). Therefore, to 
remove any bias due to gender, GENDER was included in this analysis as a covariate.  AGE and 
EDLVL were not included as covariates in the analysis.  Research by Yeaton and Stellenwerf 
(2008) suggests that for younger, less educated taxpayers, female taxpayers tend to be more 
compliant than male taxpayers; but, as educational level increases, gender is not a significant 
predictor of compliance.  In the current study, most participants were of a similar age and were 
almost all undergraduate college students.   Consequently, their inclusion in the analysis would 
not change any inferences.  
Table 4-7. 2x2x2 ANCOVA with Dependent Variable (COMPLY) 
  df F p-value 
Intercept 1 513.740 0.000 
GENDER 1 2.241 0.068 
PFORCE 1 2.885 0.045 
ETHICS 1 1.922 0.084 
PER_RISK 1 0.046 0.416 
PFORCE * ETHICS 1 2.503 0.116 
PFORCE * PER_RISK 1 1.941 0.166 
ETHICS * PER_RISK 1 4.292 0.040 
PFORCE * ETHICS * PER_RISK 1 1.198 0.275 
Error 160 	   	  
Total 169     
R Squared = .088 (Adjusted R Squared = .042)       
 
As shown in Table 4-7, a significant interaction exists between the financial risk 
perception of the taxpayer (PER_RISK) and the taxpayer's ethical orientation, (F(1, 160) = 
4.292, p = .040)9. The interaction effect represents the combined effect of the ethical orientation 
                                                
9 Results of a three way ANCOVA with the dependent variable COMPLY and the independent variable 
TOTAL_PER_RISK are presented in Appendix D.  The inclusion of financial risk perception (PER_RISK) rather 
than a total risk perception measure (TOTAL_PER_RISK) results in a better model of tax compliance.  
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of the individual and the individual’s financial risk perception on the tax compliance decision.  
Therefore, the impact of the individual’s ethical orientation measure is different for individuals 
with high financial risk perception versus individuals with low financial risk perception. 
It is best to examine the simple main effects to interpret the significant interaction.  
However, it is recommended that the p-value be adjusted when testing simple effects.  One 
procedure that is commonly used to “protect alpha” is to divide the desired p-value by the 
number of simple effects tests performed within each factor (see Pedhazur & Schmelkin, p. 527).  
In this study, the number of levels tested is 2.  Therefore, simple effects with a p-value of less 
than .025 (alpha = .05/2) are considered statistically significant.  
 For the low financial risk perception group, participants in the low ethical reasoning 
group and the high ethical reasoning group exhibited similar compliance levels.  Therefore, there 
was no significant difference in compliance among participants with low financial risk 
perception, regardless of their ethical orientation. (see Table 4-8).  However, for the high 
financial risk perception group, participants who scored in the low ethical reasoning group were  
statistically significantly less compliant than participants who scored in the high ethical 
reasoning group.   
Table 4-8. Simple Effects 
Variable Group Mean Std. Dev. F p-value 
          (2-tailed) 
Low Risk 
Perception 
Low Ethical Reasoning 0.844 0.045 0.261 0.610 
High Ethical Reasoning 0.810 0.050 	   	  
    	   	  
High Risk 
Perception 
Low Ethical Reasoning 0.751 0.055 5.446 0.021 
High Ethical Reasoning 0.925 0.050     
Note: Each F tests the simple effects of ETHICS within each level combination of the other effects 
shown. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated 
marginal means. 
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The effect size of the significant interaction is measured by the omega squared statistic.  For the 
interaction between the ethical orientation of the taxpayer and the perceived risk of the taxpayer, 
omega squared is equal to .0110.  According to Cohen, an omega-squared value between .01 and 
.0599 represents a small effect.  As can be seen visually (Figure 4-1), when a participant falls 
into the “high risk perception group” tax compliance is significantly lower for individuals with 
low ethical reasoning versus individuals with high ethical reasoning.  Specifically, mean 
compliance for the “high risk perception group” for individuals with a low ethical orientation 
was 75.1%, while the mean compliance for the “high risk perception group” for individuals with 
a high ethical orientation was 92.5% (see Table 4-7).  In contrast, however, when a participant 
falls into the “low risk perception group,” there is no significant difference in compliance 
whether the individual has low or high ethical reasoning. 
 
                                                
10 The formula for calculating omega squared is SSeffect - (dfeffect)(MSerror)/ MSerror + SStotal 
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Figure 4-1. Graph of Interaction 
 
Logistic Regression 
Binary logistic regression is used to test for possible interactions between the independent 
variables (GENDER, PFORCE, ETHICS, and PER_RISK) and the dependent variable, 
ABSCOMPLY.  Binary logistic regression is appropriate for this analysis due to the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (ABSCOMPLY).  This variable represents 
compliance separated into two groups: (1) participants who reported the full amount of income 
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earned, and (2) participants who reported any amount less than 100% of the amount of income 
earned.  
Table 4-9. Logistic Regression (ABSCOMPLY) 
   Wald's   e
β 
Predictor Β SE β χ2 df p (odds ratio) 
Constant 1.125 0.580 3.760 1 0.052 3.080 
GENDER 0.716 0.386 3.443 1 0.064 0.489 
PFORCE 0.286 0.758 0.142 1 0.706 0.751 
ETHICS 0.285 0.725 0.155 1 0.694 1.330 
PER_RISK 0.075 0.686 0.012 1 0.913 0.928 
ETHICS*PFORCE 2.040 1.374 2.203 1 0.138 7.688 
PER_RISK*PFORCE 0.987 0.998 0.977 1 0.323 2.682 
ETHICS*PER_RISK 0.424 1.005 0.178 1 0.673 0.655 
ETHICS*PER_RISK*PFORCE 1.564 1.691 0.856 1 0.355 0.209 
Test     χ2 df p   
Overall model evaluation       
     Model Chi Square   13.490 8 0.096  
Goodness-of-fit test       
     Hosmer & Lemeshow     4.673 8 0.792   
 
 Before evaluating the beta coefficients for independent variables in the logistic 
regression, the overall fit of the model was analyzed using a likelihood ratio test and a goodness 
of fit test.  The logistic regression model including GENDER, PFORCE, ETHICS, and 
PER_RISK does not demonstrate an improvement over the null model (χ2 = 13.49, p = 0.096).  
However, further testing of the overall model fit is analyzed by the Hosmer and Lemeshow chi 
square test of goodness of fit.  This measure is considered more robust than the traditional chi-
square test, particularly because the sample size is small.  A finding of non-significance 
regarding the Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicates that the model adequately fits the data.  In 
the model including GENDER, PFORCE, ETHICS, and PER_RISK, the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test is insignificant (χ2 = 4.673, p = 0.792).   Therefore, this model adequately fits the data. 
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Analysis of the beta coefficients for GENDER, PFORCE, ETHICS, and PER_RISK as 
well as the interactions (see Table 4-9) did not indicate any significant main or interaction 
effects.  
Summary 
Chapter IV presented the analysis of the data beginning with a description of the research 
hypotheses and the definitions of the variables in the study.  Descriptive data and univariate 
analysis of both dependent variables followed, reporting the findings of each hypothesis.  
Additional analyses included further tests of compliance using a three-way ANCOVA and a 
logistic regression to examine the interaction effect of the independent variables.  Chapter V 
provides a detailed discussion of the findings and limitations, as well as gives suggestions for 
future research.
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V: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In a voluntary tax system, taxpayers have an opportunity to avoid or evade the taxes.  The 
reasons and the causes of noncompliance are expansive.  One way to increase revenue to the 
government without increasing taxes is to focus on deterring tax evasion and tax underreporting.  
According to 2001 IRS estimates of the tax gap, only 1.2% of wages, salaries, and tips were 
underreported.  Therefore, the great majority of underreported income stems from self-employed 
individuals (Rettig, 2010).  Taxpayers with self-employment income, then, are more likely to 
evade the tax system and have been found to be more likely to use a paid tax preparer.  As such, 
it is important to understand the role of the tax preparer in the compliance decision of self-
employed individuals.  Additionally, there is merit in understanding the characteristics of 
individual taxpayers and the elements in the tax environment that contribute to noncompliance.  
This chapter summarizes the findings while providing a discussion of the results and the 
implications to taxpayers, tax preparers, and policy makers.  Limitations of the current research 
and ideas for future research are also presented. 
The current study was conducted to examine the effects on tax compliance of the 
taxpayer’s ethical orientation and perceived financial risk, as well as the role of the tax preparer 
in the compliance decision.  This study contributes to the tax compliance literature by providing 
evidence that communication with a tax preparer affects the individual taxpayer’s compliance 
decision.  Additionally, the study adds to the body of tax compliance literature by providing 
insight regarding the role of the tax preparer in situations where income is not reported to a third 
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party and the tax law is clear, yet noncompliance still occurs.  The role of enforcer and how the 
tax preparer communicates this enforcement has received little attention in tax compliance 
research prior to this study.  Nearly all previous research has focused on the tax preparer’s role as 
an advocate in ambiguous situations.   
Discussion of Findings 
The primary intention of this study was to investigate whether a tax preparer’s 
communication of both audit risk and required income disclosure affects a taxpayer’s compliance 
decision.  Additionally, this study aimed to provide further understanding of how risk perception 
and ethical standards affect tax compliance. Statistical analyses indicate a significant main effect 
regarding the enforcement message of the tax preparer.  Individuals receiving a high enforcement 
message are significantly more compliant that individuals receiving a low enforcement message.  
These findings, which have not been previously reported, contribute meaningfully to the 
understanding of the role of the tax preparer in the individual tax compliance decision.  The 
analysis of the relationship between ethical orientation and tax compliance provides further 
verification that individuals with high ethical reasoning are more compliant (in the measure of 
absolute compliance). 
Additionally, a significant interaction is found between the financial risk perception of 
the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s ethical orientation, implying that the impact of the ethical 
orientation of the taxpayer is different for individuals with high financial risk perception versus 
individuals with low financial risk perception.  This finding supports the existing tax compliance 
literature, specifically that of Eisenhauer et al. (2011) and Ghosh and Crain (1995) regarding the 
interactive effect of ethical standards and risk perception on the tax compliance decision.  
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The Tax Preparer and Tax Compliance 
Hypothesis H1 examines the relationship between reporting compliance and the 
enforcement message of the preparer.  It is possible that tax preparers play a far greater role in 
the tax compliance decision than research indicates.  Although prior research has focused on tax 
preparer “advice” in ambiguous tax scenarios, there has been little experimental research 
investigating the effect of the preparer on compliance when there isn’t tax ambiguity.  Yet, many 
taxpayers still choose to use a preparer when their tax situation is clear.  The existing due 
diligence requirements of Circular 230 allow preparers to rely on taxpayer-provided information 
unless the preparer has reason to believe that the information appears to be incomplete or 
incorrect.  When the tax law is clear, as is the case for full income disclosure, tax preparers 
contribute to compliance by serving as enforcers of the tax law.  This enforcement role may 
involve the tax preparer’s communication of audit risk as well the tax preparer’s demand for the 
taxpayer’s full income disclosure.   
As discussed previously, Morse et al. (2009), in a field study, found that many taxpayers 
and their preparers have a “don’t ask, don’t tell” understanding that they will not discuss cash 
income.  The analyses in this research found a statistically significant positive relationship 
between tax compliance and the high enforcement message of the tax preparer.  Individuals 
receiving the high preparer enforcement communication were explicitly reminded to indicate the 
correct amount of compensation received, while those receiving the low preparer enforcement 
communication were not.  The results from these analyses of both tax compliance rate and 
absolute tax compliance provide experimental evidence of the enforcement role of the tax 
preparer and also support the Morse et al. findings. 
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Ethics and Tax Compliance 
Hypothesis H2 investigates the relationship between tax reporting compliance and the 
ethical orientation of the taxpayer.  Tax compliance is this study is measured and tested as a rate 
of compliance and as absolute compliance (complied 100% or complied less than 100%). The 
analysis of the tax compliance rate, unlike many prior studies, did not indicate a statistically 
significant difference in compliance for individuals with a low ethical orientation versus those 
with a high ethical orientation.  However, the direction of the relationship indicates that 
compliance is higher for individuals with a higher ethical orientation.   
Interestingly, the results of this analysis are consistent with the findings of Blanthorne & 
Kaplan (2008).  Their research suggests that the opportunity to evade has indirect as well as 
direct effects on compliance and that ethical beliefs about tax evasion are influenced by 
opportunity to evade.  According to the findings of Blanthorne & Kaplan, high opportunity 
taxpayers (those who are self-employed and not participant to third party reporting) tend to judge 
underreporting of income to the government as less unethical compared to taxpayers with a low 
opportunity to evade income tax.  Therefore, taxpayers who are most likely to have the 
opportunity to evade taxes (the self-employed) are less likely to exhibit a significant correlation 
between ethical orientation and compliance behavior.  This is consistent with the findings of the 
current research. 
Although no main effect was found in the analysis of tax compliance rate and ethical 
orientation, the factorial analysis did indicate a statistically significant interaction between the 
financial risk perception of the taxpayer and the ethical orientation of the taxpayer.  This 
interaction effect represents the combined effect of the individual’s ethical orientation and the 
individual’s financial risk perception on the tax compliance rate.  Therefore, the impact of the 
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ethical orientation of the taxpayer is different for individuals with high financial risk perception 
versus individuals with low financial risk perception.  Specifically, tax compliance rate is not 
significantly different for individuals with high ethical reasoning versus low ethical reasoning, 
when the individual perceives risk to be low. However, when an individual perceives risk to be 
high, individuals with low ethical reasoning are significantly less compliant than individuals with 
high ethical reasoning. This finding supports the existing tax compliance literature, specifically 
that of Eisenhauer et al. (2011) and Ghosh and Crain (1995) regarding the joint effect of ethical 
standards and risk perception on the tax compliance decision.  
The univariate analysis of absolute compliance indicates that there is a statistically 
significant occurrence of absolute tax compliance for individuals with high ethical reasoning. 
This finding is consistent with prior research indicating that taxpayers with high ethical 
reasoning are more compliant than taxpayers with low ethical reasoning. It is interesting that 
results were insignificant for tax compliance rate and ethical reasoning, but significant for 
absolute compliance and ethical reasoning. It is possible that these results are due to the fact that 
individuals with high ethical reasoning are more likely to view noncompliance as unethical, 
regardless of the degree of noncompliance.  
Risk Perception and Tax Compliance 
In tax research, detection risk is normally thought of as the uncertainty of being audited 
and fined.  Early research, due to the use of unrealistic audit rates as well as the use of objective 
audit probabilities set by researchers, provided mixed results regarding the influence of detection 
risk and penalty on tax compliance (Carnes & Englebrecht, 1995).  Schauer and Bajor (2007) 
state that “taxpayers’ perceptions of their detection risk and the severity of the associated 
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penalties vary by taxpayer, but these perceptions are much more important than real 
probabilities, for it is their perceptions to which they are reacting” (p. 22).   
Accordingly, in this study, hypothesis H3 investigates the relationship between perceived 
financial risk of the taxpayer and tax compliance.  The analyses of the relationship between 
individual financial risk perception and both the tax compliance rate and absolute tax compliance 
fail to support hypothesis H3 and indicate that there is a not a statistically significant difference 
in compliance for individuals with high financial risk perception versus those with a low 
financial risk perception.  Nonetheless, the direction of the relationship for both tax compliance 
rate and absolute compliance indicates that individuals who perceive financial risk to be high are 
more compliant than individuals who perceive financial risk to be low.  
Additionally, as discussed above, the factorial analysis regarding tax compliance rate 
indicated a statistically significant interaction between the financial risk perception of the 
taxpayer and the ethical orientation of the taxpayer.  Tax compliance is not significantly different 
for individuals with high ethical reasoning versus low ethical reasoning, when the individual 
perceives risk to be low. However, when an individual perceives risk to be high, individuals with 
low ethical reasoning are significantly less compliant than individuals with high ethical 
reasoning.  This finding is consistent with existing tax compliance literature regarding the 
interactive effect of ethical standards and risk perception on the tax compliance decision.  
Limitations 
As with any research, limitations exist in this study.  These limitations must be 
considered when assessing the research findings.  First, the findings in this study were obtained 
in a laboratory environment.  It is possible that people may act differently in a laboratory setting 
than in real-life situations.  Additionally, the participants in the experiment were undergraduate 
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and graduate business and accounting students.  According to an analysis of accounting literature 
by Ashton and Kramer (1980), students and nonstudents make similar decisions in studies 
involving decision-making, but the fact remains that the sample of individuals in this study is not 
totally representative of the wider population of American taxpayers.  For example, the mean age 
of the participants is 21.25 years of age.  Samples that include greater representation from 
demographic groups not adequately represented in this study would allow analyses of differences 
in expected behaviors among those groups.  Also, future studies with larger sample sizes might 
improve the generalizability of the results to the entire population of taxpayers.   
Third, this study only focused on reporting of “income.”  Therefore, noncompliance due 
to excessive deductions was not analyzed and this type of noncompliance may produce different 
results.  Finally, this study does not address the rationale for the tax preparer’s choice of high or 
low enforcement communication.  Rather, this study examines the effect of communication type 
on the individual taxpayer compliance decision.  Future studies may need to incorporate the tax 
preparer’s rationale for giving a high or low enforcement message as well as the taxpayer’s 
rationale for seeking a preparer. 
Conclusions 
The current study contributes to existing individual tax compliance literature by 
providing a study of tax compliance that incorporates the influence of the preparer’s role as an 
enforcer of the tax law.  The findings distinctly exhibit the relevance of tax compliance models 
that go beyond the traditional “economics of crime approach” and capture the tax preparer’s role 
in the individual compliance decision.  When the tax preparer assumes an enforcement role, his 
or her influence may help to overcome a taxpayer’s tendency towards noncompliance due to the 
influences of the taxpayer’s ethical orientation and risk perception.  
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This study also adds to the tax compliance literature by investigating the influence of tax 
preparers in unambiguous tax situations in an experimental setting.  In an experimental setting, 
accurate compliance rates can be collected and each variable that affects compliance can be 
identified and controlled for in the experimental design (Alm et al., 2009).  Additionally, this 
study expands upon previous research by incorporating an income-earning task, rather than 
participant’s receiving an endowment or being given a hypothetical tax scenario.  By having 
participants earn income, the study provides a more realistic representation of self-employment 
income.  Finally, this study improves upon current research measuring risk by incorporating a 
domain specific risk measurement scale.  This study advances the existing individual tax 
compliance literature and can potentially assist policymakers and regulators in developing more 
effective means to increase individual tax compliance.  Regulation imposing practitioner 
penalties for taking aggressive tax positions on ambiguous items does not address the issue of 
taxpayer underpayment when the tax law is clear.  With the number of professionally prepared 
returns increasing, these findings regarding the preparer’s role in enforcement are important. 
Future Research 
Knowledge of individual factors as well as the role of the tax preparer in compliance 
could lead to better compliance rates and more effective administration of the income tax system.  
Therefore, future research should attempt to identify additional characteristics and circumstances 
that may affect compliance behaviors.  Additional research could identify factors not examined 
in this study that might account for a greater portion of the variance.  Because this is the first 
research study focusing on the role of the preparer in an unambiguous tax situation, future 
similar studies are needed to validate the results of this dissertation. 
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Mach IV Scale 
 
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
4. Most people are basically good and kind. 
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they 
are given a chance. 
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
8. Generally speaking, men don’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so. 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. 
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for 
wanting it rather than giving reasons that might carry more weight. 
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are 
stupid enough to get caught. 
14. Most men are brave. 
15. It is wise to flatter important people. 
16. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
17. Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a sucker born every minute. 
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly 
to death. 
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property. 
 
 
Positives – 1,2,5,8,12,13,15,18,19,20 
Negatives – 3,4,6,7,9,10,11,14,16,17  (must reverse code these) 
 
Information taken from “Studies in Machiavellianism” by Richard Christie  and Florence L. 
Geis; page 17-18 
 
Academic Press: New York and London (1970)   
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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Risk Perceptions (20 items included in this study) 
 
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or 
consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of negative consequences.  However, 
riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in your gut level 
assessment of how risky each situation or behavior is. 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation.  
Provide a rating from Not at all Risky to Extremely Risky, using the following scale: 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all               Slightly              Somewhat           Moderately              Risky                    Very                Extremely 
  Risky     Risky                  Risky                  Risky                    Risky                 Risky 
 
 
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (S)    
2. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F/G)                
3. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F/I)   
4. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (E)     
5. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. (S)     
6. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (F/G)     
7. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E)      
8. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R)      
9. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F/I)    
10. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. (R)     
11. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. (E)       
12. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)       
13. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)        
14. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (S)   
15. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)         
16. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.  (R)        
17. Piloting a small plane. (R)         
18. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (H/S)     
19. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (S)    
20. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (E)      
 
Note.  E = Ethical, F = Financial, H/S = Health/Safety, R = Recreational, and S = Social. 
 
 
Reference: 
Blais, A-R. and E. U. Weber. 2006. “A Domain-specific Risk-taking (DOSPERT) Scale for 
Adult Populations.” Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 33-47. 
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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Risk Perceptions (10 items not included in this 
study) 
 
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or 
consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of negative consequences.  However, 
riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in your gut level 
assessment of how risky each situation or behavior is. 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation.  
Provide a rating from Not at all Risky to Extremely Risky, using the following scale: 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all               Slightly              Somewhat           Moderately              Risky                    Very                Extremely 
  Risky     Risky                  Risky                  Risky                    Risky                 Risky 
 
 
1. Going camping in the wilderness. (R) 
2. Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S) 
3. Having an affair with a married man/woman. (E) 
4. Betting a days income on the outcome of a sporting event. (F) 
5. Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S) 
6. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F) 
7. Taking a skydiving class. (R) 
8. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. (S) 
9. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (S) 
10. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (E) 
 
Note.  E = Ethical, F = Financial, H/S = Health/Safety, R = Recreational, and S = Social. 
 
 
Reference: 
Blais, A-R. and E. U. Weber. 2006. “A Domain-specific Risk-taking (DOSPERT) Scale for 
Adult Populations.” Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 33-47.
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Questionnaire Instructions (on computer screen) 
“This is an experiment involving decision-making under uncertainty.  The experiment will be 
conducted in three phases.  In the first phase, you will complete a questionnaire.  You must 
complete the questionnaire before moving on to Phase 2.  In Phase 2, which contains a 
multiplication task, you will have the opportunity to earn up to $30 in compensation.  After 
receiving your compensation, you will be directed to another room to complete Phase 3 of the 
experiment.  This phase involves reporting your earnings and paying a 25% participation fee 
based on reported earnings.  Phase 3 is the final step in the experiment. 
You should expect to spend between 30 and 40 minutes through the entire three phases of the 
experiment. 
Identification numbers are randomly distributed and, therefore, cannot be linked to you.  Thus, 
your privacy is completely protected.  It is important to work privately.  Please do not 
communicate with other participants either verbally or in any other manner.  Complete privacy is 
important, and we expect your cooperation.  We must ask anyone found communicating with 
others in any manner to leave the room.  Please do not exit your computer station until you have 
completed the entire questionnaire and task.  If you have any questions, quietly raise your hand 
and an assistant will come to you.  After reading these instructions, you may begin completing 
the questionnaire.  You have 15 minutes to complete the 45-item questionnaire before moving to 
Phase 2. 
Press “Next” to begin the questionnaire.” 
  
85 
Questionnaire
You will find a series of general statements below.  Each represents a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers.  You will probably disagree with   
some%items%and%agree%with%others.%%I%am%interested%in%the%extent%to%which%you%agree%or%disagree%with%such%matters%of%opinions.
Please%read%each%statement%carefully.%%Please%use%the%following%scale%to%indicate%your%agreement/disagreement%with%the%statements%below
%by%circling%the%appropriate%number.
1 = Strongly Disagree;
2 = Disagree;
3 = Neutral;
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
1 Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 1 2 3 4 5
2 The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 1 2 3 4 5
3 One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 1 2 3 4 5
4 Most people are basically good and kind. 1 2 3 4 5
5 It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out 
when they are given the chance. 1 2 3 4 5
6 Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 1 2 3 4 5
7 There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 1 2 3 4 5
8 Generally speaking, men don’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so. 1 2 3 4 5
9 All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. 1 2 3 4 5
10 When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real 
reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. 1 2 3 4 5
11 Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 1 2 3 4 5
12 Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 1 2 3 4 5
13 The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals 
are stupid enough to get caught. 1 2 3 4 5
14 Most people are brave. 1 2 3 4 5
15 It is wise to flatter important people. 1 2 3 4 5
16 It is possible to be good in all respects. 1 2 3 4 5
17 Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a sucker born every minute. 1 2 3 4 5
18 It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 1 2 3 4 5
19 People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put 
painlessly to death. 1 2 3 4 5
20 Most people forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their 
property. 1 2 3 4 5  
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Not at all Moderately Extremely
Risky Risky Risky
21 Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22 Betting a day’s income at the horse races. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23 Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24 Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25 Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26 Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27 Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28 Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29 Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30 Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31 Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32 Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33 Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34 Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35 Sunbathing without sunscreen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36 Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37 Piloting a small plane. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38 Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39 Moving to a city far away from your extended family. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40 Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of negative
consequences.  However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each situation or behavior is.
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation.  Provide a rating from Not at all Risky to Extremely Risky, using the scale:
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41. Are you male or female? 
Male 
Female 
 
42. In what year were you born? (enter 4-digit birth year; for example, 1976) 
 
 
 
43. Please indicate your classification: 
o Freshman 
o Sophomore 
o Junior 
o Senior 
o Graduate 
 
44 . What is your major? 
o Business 
o Accountancy 
o Other 
o Undecided 
 
45. Please indicate your approximate GPA 
o 3.5 – 4.0 
o 3.0 – 3.5 
o 2.5 - 3.0 
o 2.0 – 2.5 
o below 2.0 
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Participant Multiplication Task and Earnings Form 
You have 12 minutes to solve the 15 multiplication problems below.  Your payment for this task 
is $2.00 for every correct solution.  Therefore, you are able to earn an amount between $0 and 
$30 based on the number of correct solutions.  Please do not communicate with others or use any 
form of calculator to complete this task.  A piece of scratch paper and a pencil are provided to 
you.  Use the paper and pencil to hand-calculate the solutions and type your response in the box 
beneath each problem.  Press enter to begin the task. 
 
(Participant presses enter and the problems appear on the screen) 
 
 
263 85 29
x 8 x 66 x 0
40 994 92
x 849 x 91 x 87
383 27 322
x 61 x 14 x 56
52 243 610
x 7 x 81 x 409
716 64 381
x 531 x 9 x 50
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Earnings Form Instructions  
 
You are receiving compensation based on the number of multiplication problems you solved correctly. After receiving your 
compensation, please remember to put your money in your wallet, pocket or purse.  When you leave your computer and proceed 
to the next room, a fee assistant will help you calculate your participation fee.  You will need to fill in your compensation on your 
earnings form, because the fee assistant does NOT have a record of the compensation you received. After you fill in your 
compensation on your earnings form, the fee assistant will calculate your fee and ask you to place the fee in your envelope with 
your earnings form and instructions.  
 
Your participation fee is calculated as 25% of the amount of earnings you report on your earnings form. There is not enough time 
for the researcher to check whether each participant reported the actual compensation received.  However, you will be asked to 
spin a bingo cage when you exit this room.  The bingo cage contains 49 white balls and one red ball.  If you receive one of the 49 
white balls, your earnings form is not checked and you have completed all phases of the experiment and are free to go. If you 
spin the cage and receive the one red ball, your earnings form will be checked.  You will be asked to go back to the lab so that the 
lab assistant can verify that the amount of earnings you reported is equal to the compensation you received.  This means that 
there is a 2% chance that your earnings form will be checked and a 98% chance that your earnings form will not be checked.  
 
REMEMBER:  There is only a 2% chance that your earnings form will be checked. 
 
 
Earnings Form Instructions 
 
You are receiving compensation based on the number of multiplication problems you solved correctly. After receiving your 
compensation, please remember to put your money in your wallet, pocket or purse.  When you leave your computer and proceed 
to the next room, a fee assistant will help you calculate your participation fee.  You will need to fill in your compensation on your 
earnings form, because the fee assistant does NOT have a record of the compensation you received. After you fill in your 
compensation on your earnings form, the fee assistant will calculate your fee and ask you to place the fee in your envelope with 
your earnings form and instructions.  
 
Your participation fee is calculated as 25% of the amount of earnings you report on your earnings form. There is not enough time 
for the researcher to check whether each participant reported the actual compensation received.  However, you will be asked to 
spin a bingo cage when you exit this room.  The bingo cage contains 49 white balls and one red ball.  If you receive one of the 49 
white balls, your earnings form is not checked and you have completed all phases of the experiment and are free to go. If you 
spin the cage and receive the one red ball, your earnings form will be checked.  You will be asked to go back to the lab so that the 
lab assistant can verify that the amount of earnings you reported is equal to the compensation you received.  This means that 
there is a 2% chance that your earnings form will be checked and a 98% chance that your earnings form will not be checked.  
 
REMEMBER:  While there is only a 2% chance that your earnings form will be checked, you are 
expected to indicate correctly the amount of money provided to you as compensation and pay the 
required participation fee. 
 
 
Earnings Form 
Amount Earned:                _________________ 
X  25% Participation Fee  _________________ 
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APPENDIX C: VERIFICATION OF PFORCE AND ETHICS FOR CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Data for “Completely Noncompliant” Participants (ABSComply is “0”) and for Completely 
Compliant Participants (ABSComply is “1”) 
Absolute Compliance Sorted into Absolute Compliance Sorted into 
High and Low Enforcement High and Low Ethics
Subject ID AbsComply Pforce Ethics Subject ID AbsComply Pforce Ethics
117 0 1 2 110 0 2 1
166 0 1 1 114 0 2 1
225 0 1 2 118 0 2 1
235 0 1 2 130 0 2 1
239 0 1 2 164 0 2 1
244 0 1 1 166 0 1 1
249 0 1 2 218 0 2 1
251 0 1 2 224 0 2 1
252 0 1 1 228 0 2 1
270 0 1 1 238 0 2 1
405 0 1 2 244 0 1 1
413 0 1 2 252 0 1 1
471 0 1 2 270 0 1 1
475 0 1 2 456 0 2 1
494 0 1 1 476 0 2 1
505 0 1 2 494 0 1 1
508 0 1 1 508 0 1 1
High Enforcement 17 High Ethics 17
101 0 2 2 101 0 2 2
110 0 2 1 115 0 2 2
114 0 2 1 117 0 1 2
115 0 2 2 131 0 2 2
118 0 2 1 133 0 2 2
130 0 2 1 145 0 2 2
131 0 2 2 223 0 2 2
133 0 2 2 225 0 1 2
145 0 2 2 235 0 1 2
164 0 2 1 237 0 2 2
218 0 2 1 239 0 1 2
223 0 2 2 243 0 2 2
224 0 2 1 249 0 1 2
228 0 2 1 251 0 1 2
237 0 2 2 255 0 2 2
238 0 2 1 347 0 2 2
243 0 2 2 405 0 1 2
255 0 2 2 409 0 2 2
347 0 2 2 413 0 1 2
409 0 2 2 415 0 2 2
415 0 2 2 445 0 2 2
445 0 2 2 469 0 2 2
456 0 2 1 471 0 1 2
469 0 2 2 475 0 1 2
476 0 2 1 481 0 2 2
481 0 2 2 505 0 1 2
Low Enforcement 26 Low Ethics 26
Total Noncomply 43 Total Noncomply 43
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Absolute Compliance Sorted into Absolute Compliance Sorted into Absolute Compliance Sorted into Absolute Compliance Sorted into 
High and Low Enforcement High and Low Ethics High and Low Enforcement High and Low Ethics
Subject ID AbsComply Pforce Ethics Subject ID AbsComply Pforce Ethics Subject ID AbsComply Pforce Ethics Subject ID AbsComply Pforce Ethics
102 1 1 1 102 1 1 1 104 1 2 1 103 1 1 2
103 1 1 2 104 1 2 1 106 1 2 1 105 1 1 2
105 1 1 2 106 1 2 1 107 1 2 2 107 1 2 2
108 1 1 1 108 1 1 1 111 1 2 2 109 1 1 2
109 1 1 2 112 1 2 1 112 1 2 1 111 1 2 2
113 1 1 2 116 1 1 1 119 1 2 2 113 1 1 2
116 1 1 1 120 1 2 1 120 1 2 1 119 1 2 2
122 1 1 1 122 1 1 1 121 1 2 2 121 1 2 2
123 1 1 2 124 1 1 1 132 1 2 1 123 1 1 2
124 1 1 1 126 1 1 1 138 1 2 1 125 1 1 2
125 1 1 2 128 1 1 1 139 1 2 2 129 1 1 2
126 1 1 1 132 1 2 1 144 1 2 1 139 1 2 2
128 1 1 1 138 1 2 1 146 1 2 1 141 1 1 2
129 1 1 2 140 1 1 1 147 1 2 2 147 1 2 2
140 1 1 1 142 1 1 1 152 1 2 1 149 1 1 2
141 1 1 2 144 1 2 1 153 1 2 2 151 1 1 2
142 1 1 1 146 1 2 1 177 1 2 2 153 1 2 2
148 1 1 1 148 1 1 1 183 1 2 2 177 1 2 2
149 1 1 2 150 1 1 1 193 1 2 2 183 1 2 2
150 1 1 1 152 1 2 1 200 1 2 1 193 1 2 2
151 1 1 2 188 1 1 1 217 1 2 2 217 1 2 2
188 1 1 1 196 1 1 1 220 1 2 1 219 1 1 2
196 1 1 1 200 1 2 1 227 1 2 2 221 1 1 2
219 1 1 2 220 1 2 1 229 1 2 2 227 1 2 2
221 1 1 2 222 1 1 1 230 1 2 1 229 1 2 2
222 1 1 1 226 1 1 1 232 1 2 1 231 1 1 2
226 1 1 1 230 1 2 1 235 1 2 2 235 1 2 2
231 1 1 2 232 1 2 1 242 1 2 1 241 1 1 2
234 1 1 1 234 1 1 1 247 1 2 2 247 1 2 2
236 1 1 1 236 1 1 1 250 1 2 1 253 1 1 2
240 1 1 1 240 1 1 1 262 1 2 1 261 1 1 2
241 1 1 2 242 1 2 1 263 1 2 2 263 1 2 2
246 1 1 1 246 1 1 1 267 1 2 2 265 1 1 2
248 1 1 1 248 1 1 1 271 1 2 2 267 1 2 2
253 1 1 2 250 1 2 1 288 1 2 1 269 1 1 2
254 1 1 1 254 1 1 1 296 1 2 1 271 1 2 2
261 1 1 2 262 1 2 1 346 1 2 1 273 1 1 2
264 1 1 1 264 1 1 1 352 1 2 1 279 1 1 2
265 1 1 2 266 1 1 1 401 1 2 2 283 1 1 2
266 1 1 1 268 1 1 1 406 1 2 1 401 1 2 2
268 1 1 1 288 1 2 1 431 1 2 2 431 1 2 2
269 1 1 2 296 1 2 1 432 1 2 1 457 1 1 2
273 1 1 2 340 1 1 1 470 1 2 1 473 1 2 2
279 1 1 2 346 1 2 1 473 1 2 2 483 1 2 2
283 1 1 2 352 1 2 1 474 1 2 1 491 1 1 2
340 1 1 1 364 1 1 1 482 1 2 1 493 1 1 2
364 1 1 1 402 1 1 1 483 1 2 2 501 1 1 2
402 1 1 1 404 1 1 1 502 1 2 1 503 1 2 2
404 1 1 1 406 1 2 1 503 1 2 2 503 1 2 2
408 1 1 1 408 1 1 1 503 1 2 2 507 1 2 2
410 1 1 1 410 1 1 1 504 1 2 1 509 1 2 2
410 1 1 1 410 1 1 1 507 1 2 2 521 1 1 2
414 1 1 1 414 1 1 1 509 1 2 2 523 1 1 2
457 1 1 2 432 1 2 1 535 1 2 2 535 1 2 2
458 1 1 1 458 1 1 1 537 1 2 2 537 1 2 2
470 1 1 1 470 1 2 1 548 1 2 1 549 1 1 2
484 1 1 1 470 1 1 1 Low Enforcement 56 Low Ethics 56
491 1 1 2 474 1 2 1
493 1 1 2 482 1 2 1 Total Comply 126 126
500 1 1 1 484 1 1 1
501 1 1 2 500 1 1 1
506 1 1 1 502 1 2 1
520 1 1 1 504 1 2 1
521 1 1 2 506 1 1 1
522 1 1 1 520 1 1 1
523 1 1 2 522 1 1 1
524 1 1 1 524 1 1 1
536 1 1 1 536 1 1 1
549 1 1 2 548 1 2 1
550 1 1 1 550 1 1 1
High Enforcement 70 High Ethics 70
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APPENDIX D: ANALYSES USING TOTAL PERCEIVED RISK 
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Analysis of Variance and Analysis of Covariance Results 
 
One-way ANOVA with Dependent Variable (COMPLY) 
  df F p-value 
Intercept 1 1170.195 0.000 
TOTAL_PER_RISK 1 0.021 0.422 
Error 167 	   	  
Total 169     
R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = .006) 
 
 
2x2x2 ANCOVA with Dependent Variable (COMPLY) 
  df F p-value 
Intercept 1 481.702 0.000 
GENDER 1 1.818 0.179 
PFORCE 1 2.290 0.132 
ETHICS 1 1.291 0.258 
TOTAL_PER_RISK (ALL DOMAINS) 1 0.009 0.927 
PFORCE * ETHICS 1 1.140 0.287 
PFORCE * TOTAL_PER_RISK 1 0.502 0.480 
ETHICS * PER_RISK 1 0.042 0.838 
PFORCE * ETHICS * TOTAL_PER_RISK 1 0.004 0.947 
Error 160 	   	  
Total 169     
R Squared = .049 (Adjusted R Squared = .002)       
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